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THE FALCON CANNOT HEAR THE
FALCONER: HOW CALIFORNIA’S
INITIATIVE PROCESS IS CREATING AN
UNTENABLE CONSTITUTION
Rudy Klapper∗
Californians have always cherished the idea that ultimate
political power lies in the people, an idea best represented by the
state’s hugely influential initiative process. Today, however, that
initiative power threatens to spiral out of control, thanks in large part
to the California Supreme Court’s inability to construe appropriate
limits on it. This has created an unbalanced government where the
rights of minorities are easily circumscribed and the financial and
political infrastructure of the state is in danger of buckling under the
combined weight of dozens of initiatives. This Article argues that the
judiciary’s haphazard interpretation of various rules and regulations
regarding the initiative has created a situation where the necessary
checks and balances in a republican system are in danger of being
subverted. Furthermore, this Article proposes stricter standards for the
initiative process and encourages the court to turn a more discerning
eye onto the wave of initiatives generated each year. Embracing a more
stringent initiative will preserve the importance of the people’s power
while still safeguarding the rights of all who call California home.
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invaluable helping hand along the way, and to my editor Karen Roche, without whose assistance
and guidance this Article would never have made it to publication. I also want to thank the staff
and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all their input and work, particularly
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I. INTRODUCTION
It’s not hard to let it go from a mess to the masses.1
From California’s first constitutional convention in 1849,
Californians have cherished the idea that power ultimately lies in the
people.2 Indeed, the idea of popular sovereignty—that power in the
government inherently lies with the people it is meant to govern—
has been a key facet of the United States political system since the
framers of the Federal Constitution first articulated the idea in 1787.3
That idea of popular sovereignty is also reflected in California’s
initiative power, which has allowed its people to directly propose
statutes and amendments to the California Constitution since 1911.4
Today, however, the people’s initiative power5 threatens to
spiral out of control. The initiative process and the resulting
substantial changes it has made to the state constitution have reduced
the state government to a gridlocked, impoverished entity.6
Initiatives often worsen the very problems they ostensibly aim to
fix.7 Indeed, the ideals that the people’s initiative stood for when it
was created have been transformed; rather than allowing the people
to fight against controlling elites in government, ballot initiatives
have become a favored instrument of those same controlling
interests.8 This threatens to upset the necessary balance between
direct democracy—a form of government whereby the people, not
their elected representatives, create the laws and policies9—and the
1. PHOENIX, LISZTOMANIA, on WOLFGANG AMADEUS PHOENIX (V2 Records 2009).
2. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
3. “We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.” U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Abraham Lincoln, President of the
United States, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (“[G]overnment of the people, by the people,
for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”).
4. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
5. See id.
6. Byron Williams, Voters Have Had a Major Hand in Creating Dysfunctional
Government, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (May 26, 2012), http://www.contracostatimes.com/columns
/ci_20716383/byron-williams-voters-have-had-major-hand-creating.
7. Id.
8. The Perils of Extreme Democracy, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2011, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/18586520.
9. Robert Longley, Direct Democracy, ABOUT.COM, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od
/thepoliticalsystem/a/Direct-Democracy.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2013).
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system of checks and balances inherent in a republican
government.10
California’s initiative system was designed to protect the people
from the machinations of controlling interests like the Southern
Pacific Railroad, the dominant corporate power in early
twentieth-century California.11 The initiative power opened a new
avenue that allowed proposed legislation to become law, uninhibited
by controlling corporate views.12 The unhindered growth of the
initiative process, however, has turned this initial purpose on its
head, at times harming the people instead of protecting them. Today,
initiatives are often funded by the same “well-heeled corporate
interests” that early twentieth-century Progressives would have
blanched at.13
The California Supreme Court, whose self-proclaimed role has
always been to “jealously [guard] the sovereign people’s initiative
power,”14 has shaped the parameters of the initiative and referendum
power since the creation of the initiative.15 However, far from
clarifying the extent and limits of the people’s initiative power, the
court’s decisions have instead resulted in a hundred years of
uncertainty.16 Although the court has attempted to be a guiding force
for California’s ballot initiative process, the court’s loose application
of various limitations on the initiative has allowed narrow, hastily
assembled majorities to do as they please.17 This has opened up
California to the possibility of a pure majoritarian government
vulnerable to factions and passing fads, one that potentially
undermines core values of both republican government and the
California Constitution itself.18 California’s disastrous and ultimately
10. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
11. Karl M. Manheim, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (1998).
12. Id.
13. See id. at 1190 (“[T]he insurance industry spent $88 million dollars on California
initiatives in 1988—more than George Bush spent on his entire presidential campaign . . . .”).
14. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 277 (Cal. 1982).
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See Ray L. Ngo, The Elephant in the Room: A Critique of California’s Constitutional
Amendment Process That Gave Birth to the Baby Elephant (Proposition 8) and a Call For Its
Reform, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 235, 244–52 (2011).
17. See Angela Chrysler, Proposition 8 and the Need for California Constitutional
Amendment Initiative Reform: Tolerance Requires Time and Deliberation, 37 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 591, 606 (2010).
18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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failed flirtation with a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage is just
one example of an initiative process run amok.”19
Three vital constitutional limitations on the initiative power
strive to maintain the balance between direct democracy and
republicanism: the distinction between a constitutional revision and
an amendment, the “single-subject” rule, and the legislature’s ability
to amend an initiative statute.20 However, the California Supreme
Court’s various and often inconsistent decisions on these limitations
have failed to preserve the principles these limitations reflect.21 One
result of these decisions is that the initiative power may subvert the
California Constitution’s avowed goal of protecting the minority
from the majority.22
In an ideal democracy like the one envisioned by the framers of
the initiative process,
the freedom of the individual can only be legitimately
constrained by the State insofar as the State’s action is the
product of the people’s will . . . Every participant,
regardless of their own moral viewpoint, must be willing to
listen to others, to give her opponents’ arguments a
fair-minded hearing . . . [and] must not fail to respect the
dignity of her fellow citizens.23
California’s current system of direct democracy, however, allows a
bare majority to erode the essence of the California Constitution
without the opportunity for both sides to be heard.24 Given that
republicanism’s essential nature is to prevent the “tyranny of the
majority,”25 this is an untenable position. If both direct democracy
and republicanism are to have a place in California government,26
then the distinctions and relationship between the two should be

19. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
20. See infra Part II.
21. E.g., Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112 (Cal. 1995); Strauss, 207
P.3d 48; Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990); Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274
(Cal. 1982); Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization, 583
P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978); see infra Part II.C.1–3.
22. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
23. Anna Marie Smith, The Paradoxes of Popular Constitutionalism: Proposition 8 and
Strauss v. Horton, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 517, 586–87 (2010).
24. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
25. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859).
26. It is unlikely that the current initiative system will be changed. See Jim Sanders, Bill to
Stiffen Ballot-Initiative Rules Dies, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 30, 2012, at A4.
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clearly defined and easily discernible. The power of one should not
be allowed to overwhelm the other.
This Article suggests that the judiciary should moderate the
people’s initiative power so as to correct the imbalance that exists
between the legislative initiative power and the legislature. Instead of
enabling an initiative system where a well-funded group can
campaign for the bare majority needed to take minority rights
away,27 the court should strive for a system similar to the
legislature’s, where careful thought and a thorough vetting process
are required before any hastily assembled proposition is made into
law. The court should cast aside its preference for isolated technical
rules and instead look at each initiative on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether it meets or violates the three important principles
that govern initiatives. It should construe these principles strictly and
invalidate propositions that violate them. Only by doing this can the
court restore the proper balance between the people’s legislative
power and the legislature’s and ensure that the exercise of direct
democracy will be restricted to its constitutionally mandated
boundaries.
Part II discusses the competing theories of republicanism and
direct democracy and the history leading up to the enactment of the
California ballot initiative.28 It identifies the structural components of
the initiative process, examines how the California Supreme Court
has handled the three limitations on the initiative power, and
explores how the court’s decisions have shaped the initiative process.
Part III argues that the court’s haphazard interpretation of the
people’s initiative power and the various limitations on it have given
that power a dangerously broad reach. This has directly led to the
flooding of the political process with initiatives, which in turn has
promoted the reckless expansion and inefficiency of the California
state government. Part III also argues that the electorate’s broad
power to enact fundamental changes, which results from the court’s
technical formulation of the rules governing initiatives, encroaches
on California’s system of republicanism and threatens to leave a
government where the bare majority is in control. Government by a
bare majority without any consideration or protection for minorities

27. See infra Part II.C.1.c.
28. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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is a perversion of the republican system California and the United
States were meant to embody.
Finally, Part IV proposes that the court should forsake its
preference for using technical, formalistic rules in isolation and
instead subject each initiative to a stricter application of the three
principles governing the initiative system. The court’s approach
should further the purpose of the overriding constitutional division of
power between the electorate and the legislature by delineating clear
and sharp lines between the conflicting ideas of republicanism and
direct democracy. Additionally, Part IV advises the California
legislature to attempt to modify the initiative process so as to provide
a thoughtful approach—one that enhances rather than subverts
reasoned analysis of an initiative’s effects. This part also suggests
possible limitations on the people’s initiative power that will
nevertheless maintain the initiative as the important, powerful tool of
popular sovereignty it was intended to be.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INITIATIVE
No discussion of the people’s initiative power can begin without
an explanation of the competing theories of republicanism and direct
democracy and how these two ideals contributed to the founding of
California and the Progressive movement that birthed the initiative.29
Since the initiative’s creation in 1911, the California Supreme
Court’s interpretation of its use and limits has evolved to reflect
three primary limitations on the initiative’s power: the
revision-amendment distinction,30 the single-subject rule,31 and the
legislature’s ability to amend an initiative statute.32
A. The Conflicting Ideals of Republicanism and Democracy
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were well aware of the
dangers of democracy in its pure or idealized form—namely anarchy
if the people were allowed to exercise unlimited control.33 As a
result, they did not provide any mechanism for direct change by the
29. See infra Part II.A–B.
30. See infra Part II.C.1.
31. See infra Part II.C.2.
32. See infra Part II.C.3.
33. See id.; see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859)
(speaking of the “tyranny of the majority” that greatly influenced the Federalists in the writing of
the Federal Constitution).
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people, either at the legislative or constitutional levels.34 Instead,
they advocated for a republic, a form of government in which there is
an organized scheme of representation to effectuate the people’s
will.35 This concept of representation via an elected legislative
body—and a “proper structure”36 that included the tripartite system
of legislature, executive, and judiciary—was considered necessary to
achieve a government that could equally balance the various factions
that composed it.37 In this republican system, every change in the law
must come from the representatives the people elect, and there is no
direct method of amending the Constitution.38 This ponderous
system of checks and balances prevents, or at least restrains, a
majority from enacting laws contrary to the interests of
underrepresented factions.39
Political theorists at the time the Constitution was framed
frequently warned against John Stuart Mill’s “tyranny of the
majority,” which they regarded as “among the evils against which
society requires to be on its guard.”40 It is those everyday factions
where citizens “united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest”41 must be controlled by republican
constitutional design.42 Thus, while a controlling majority can be

34. See U.S. CONST. art V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments . . . [which must be] ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . .”).
35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
36. Id. at 80–81.
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“It is
of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers,
but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10 at 80–81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that pure
democracies have often been marked by violence and contention and have generally not lasted as
long as more stable republican forms of government).
38. Congress may propose an amendment by a two-thirds majority in both houses, in which
case it must then be ratified by three-quarters of the states via either their legislatures or a
constitutional convention. Two-thirds of the state legislatures may also propose an amendment by
calling a constitutional convention, which must then also be ratified by three-quarters of the states
to pass into law. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
39. See Smith, supra note 23, at 564.
40. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859).
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books
1987).
42. See Smith, supra note 23, at 564.
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expected in the course of regular legislative activity,43 the
Constitution’s rigorous procedures for fundamental change safeguard
the forms and tenets of government from those majority factions the
framers feared so much.44
However, while republicanism triumphed as the form of
government embodied in the U.S. Constitution, other framers,
particularly those protective of individual states’ rights, still
championed a system of direct democracy.45 Thomas Jefferson,
perhaps the best-known of the Anti-Federalists, wrote that “[t]he
mass of the citizens is the safest depository of their own rights
and . . . the evils flowing from the duperies of the people are less
injurious than those from the egoism of their agents . . . .”46 This
distrust of government not directly controlled by the populace
manifested itself in several state governments.47 Jefferson himself
advocated for a periodic review of the entire constitution rather than
the difficult amendatory process adopted by the Federalists.48
Jefferson argued that “no society can make a perpetual constitution,”
explaining that “[e]very constitution, then, and every law, naturally
expires. . . . If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of
right.”49 According to Jefferson, only through greater citizen
control—via a direct democracy-like system of periodic
constitutional review—could a state’s governing organ accurately
reflect the will and changing mores of its people.50

43. James Madison made a distinction between everyday conditions “in which passions and
factions predominate” and those “great and extraordinary occasions” wherein the people might be
so moved as to rise up and involve themselves in constitutional lawmaking. THE FEDERALIST NO.
49, at 314–15 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
44. Id.
45. Smith, supra note 23, at 565.
46. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 668, 672–73 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden
eds., 1944).
47. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS 25–26 (1989).
48. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, POLITICAL WRITINGS 596 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball
eds., 1999).
49. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 23, at 567 (explaining Jefferson’s stance on a form of
direct democracy that used the periodic constitutional convention as an appropriate exercise of
political power and the difficulty of establishing an acceptable constitution without it).
50. See Smith, supra note 23, at 567.
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B. Progressivism and the Birth of the Initiative
At the close of the nineteenth century, the government of
California was hopelessly fractured and inefficient.51 Although the
Second Constitutional Convention of 1878–79 had resulted in
numerous reforms aimed at curbing the influence of special interests,
and prescribed serious restrictions on both legislative and corporate
power,52 the reforms had little effect.53 In 1880, just a year after the
Convention concluded, nearly every position of power in the
California government was tied to the controlling special interest of
the era, the Southern Pacific Railroad.54 The railroad chose most of
the state and local candidates for public office, openly sold and
traded judgeships at will, and was the largest landowner in the
state.55 The overwhelming corruption and power the Southern Pacific
exercised over California politics led one commentator to liken the
state to a “Banana Republic,”56 where no legislation was passed or
struck down without the omnipotent corporation having a say in it.57
Having seen few benefits from the 1878–79 constitutional
convention, Californians experienced profound distrust and
animosity toward the established legislature as the nineteenth century
drew to a close.58 Many found inspiration in the Progressive
movement, which played a fundamental role in shaping the
governments of many Western states.59 Its adherents believed that
direct democracy could be beneficial in eradicating widespread
51. See Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the
Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11,
29–30 (1997).
52.
Among the significant transformations of power was the establishment of “home rule”
for California cities. This reform sought to decentralize power in the mistrusted state
government by guaranteeing local autonomy . . . . [C]ontrolling the railroad
corporations “was undoubtedly one of the major purposes for which the constitutional
convention was called.”
Manheim, supra note 11, at 1183 (quoting CARL BRENT SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL
TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1878–79, 112 (New York: Da
Capo Press, 1969)).
53. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1184.
54. “Scarcely a vote was cast in either house that did not show some aspect of Southern
Pacific ownership, petty vengeance, or legislative blackmail.” GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE
CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 63 (1951).
55. See id. at 11–13.
56. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1185.
57. MOWRY, supra note 54, at 63.
58. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1185–86.
59. See Persily, supra note 51, at 15, 20.
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dishonesty in government.60 They pointed to the American tradition
of town hall meetings and the success of the Swiss canton system
abroad.61 As one writer made clear, the type of crooked government
the Progressives rallied against fit the Southern Pacific “Banana
Republic” of California to the letter:
[T]here has arisen in our midst in recent years a powerful
plutocracy composed of the great public-service
magnates . . . who have succeeded in placing in positions of
leadership political bosses that are susceptible to the
influence of corrupt wealth. . . . [T]he government has
become largely a government of privileged wealth, for
privileged interests, by the lawlessness of the privileged
ones and their tools, with the result that the people are
continually exploited and corruption is steadily spreading
throughout all the ramifications of political life.62
These ideals found root in the merchant middle class of
Southern California and a leadership of conservative Republican
professionals.63 As a direct result of the state’s corruption and the
inability of the legislature to extricate itself from corporate control,
this group would spearhead the reform movement that eventually led
to the election of Republican governor Hiram Johnson and a number
of other Progressive legislators in 1910.64 Johnson in turn called a
special election “to fulfill his promise that powerful private interests
would never again dominate state government.”65 The ballot
initiative was one of several successful amendments to the California
Constitution as a result of that special election.66 California became
one of the first states to enable lawmaking by initiative.67 The 1911
ballot pamphlet informing voters of the initiative laid out—in plain,

60. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1186.
61. Persily, supra note 51, at 15.
62. FRANK PARSONS ET AL., A PRIMER OF DIRECT-LEGISLATION 7 (1906) (reprinted from
THE ARENA, May, June, and July 1906).
63. MOWRY, supra note 54, at 22.
64. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1186–87.
65. Id. at 1187.
66. Others passed in that election included the powers of referendum and recall. See The
Vote on Amendments No’s 4, 7, 8, 16 in the State, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 11, 1911, at
A1.
67. Only South Dakota (1898), Utah (1900), and Oregon (1902) preceded California in
allowing the initiative. See Persily, supra note 51, at 16.
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convincing terms—its promoters’ goal of reasserting the people’s
will:
It is not intended and will not be a substitute for legislation,
but will constitute that safeguard which the people should
retain for themselves to supplement the work of the
legislature by initiating those measures which the
legislature either viciously or negligently fails or refuses to
enact; and to hold the legislature in check, and to veto or
negative such measures as it may viciously or negligently
enact.68
The Progressive ideals championed by Governor Johnson and
his Republican supporters during the initiative campaign emphasized
the “popular skepticism and restlessness with established authorities”
that had been a hallmark of California politics since its founding.69
They also offered strong, convincing arguments for direct democracy
in the wake of a republican system of government that had become
hopelessly and openly crooked.70
Thus, it would seem that Thomas Jefferson’s idea—that the
constitution should be an organ flexible to the changing needs of
those it governs—is in accordance with California’s system of
amendment by ballot initiative.71 However, Jefferson believed that
such flexible review and change to the Constitution should apply to
the organ as a whole.72 Jefferson preferred “an integrative approach
in which the whole document can be voted down in favor of an
entirely different draft,” not one in which a single issue such as
same-sex marriage is placed on its own before the electorate.73
Jefferson’s approach would allow such an issue, proposed as part of
a larger constitutional convention, to be entertained and debated by
both its proponents and its opponents—the former would be allowed
to present justifications, while the latter would no doubt point out
that the amendment would violate an essential principle like equal
68. OFF. OF CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, SPECIAL ELECTION VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE:
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NUMBER 22 (1911) (providing statements by State Senator for
the 34th District Lee C. Gates and Assemblyman for the 59th District William C. Clark).
69. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1174.
70. Id. at 1187.
71. See Smith, supra note 23, at 568.
72. THOMAS JEFFERSON, POLITICAL WRITINGS 596 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds.,
1999).
73. Smith, supra note 23, at 568.
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protection.74 Indeed, Jefferson’s idea of a periodic constitutional
convention more resembles the measured debate and deliberative
thinking that characterizes regular legislative activity and not the
simplistic mechanism of initiatives.75 Jefferson would surely see the
difference between his system of a constitutional convention
reflecting “historical developments, empirical experience, and
improvements in knowledge” and a process as exceedingly casual as
California’s amendment by initiative.76
Despite the inconsistencies between the Jeffersonian philosophy
and the Progressive movement, the Progressives nonetheless strongly
believed in the Jeffersonian ideal that the common man could be
rationally involved in successful self-government.77 They argued that
individual factions could not dominate the community because the
different individuals constituting the community created a body
where “[n]o one selfish interest is powerful enough to overcome all
the others; they must wear each other away until general welfare,
according to the views of the majority acting, is substituted for the
individual selfish interest.”78 The Progressives idealistically believed
that this would prevent “hasty or unwise community action,” trusting
that
no individual will ever vote for, or willingly assent to, a
change, unless satisfied that that change will directly benefit
him individually, or that the action will bring improved
general welfare to the community. . . . [C]ommunity action
determines the average of individual interests, and secures
the greatest good for the greatest number.79
The Progressives wholeheartedly believed that the initiative
power provided the best tool available for reaching their goal of a
government free of corruption and open to the common man.80 Not
74. Id.
75. See id. at 569.
76. Id. at 568.
77. See Persily, supra note 51, at 27–28; see also Chrysler, supra note 17, at 599 (“We find
that happiness, enlightment [sic] and propserty [sic] among the people increase in precisely the
same ration [sic] as do their power, influence, and participation in government.” (quoting John
Randolph Haynes, an early twentieth-century California Progressive)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
78. Jonathan Bourne, Functions of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, 43 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 3, 11 (1912).
79. Id. at 12.
80. See Persily, supra note 51, at 28.
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until the initiative was codified and the California Supreme Court
began to shape the contours of its power did it become clear that this
ease of changing the constitution created multiple new challenges for
the state.81 To understand how this occurred, it is necessary to first
examine the initiative process itself.
C. Procedure of the Initiative
To begin the initiative process, sponsors write a petition
containing the text of the proposed statute or constitutional
amendment and send it to the Secretary of State82 of California.83
The attorney general then writes an impartial title84 and summary for
inclusion on the petitions that are circulated to citizens.85 That
petition must be certified as signed by citizens eligible to vote in
California, in a number equal to 5 percent (for a statute) or 8 percent
(for an amendment) of the votes for all candidates for governor at the
most recent election.86 If the requisite number of signatures is
collected, the Secretary of State then submits the measure to the
voters at the next general election, at least 131 days after the
initiative has qualified.87 Following that, proponents and opponents
of a ballot measure provide arguments favoring or opposing the
initiative.88 Although these arguments cannot ordinarily be checked
for accuracy or altered, a challenger may petition a court to order
changes in an argument’s language.89

81. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1188.
82. At the local level, the petition is sent to the City or Country Clerk. TRACY M. GORDON,
PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, THE LOCAL INITIATIVE IN CALIFORNIA 9 (2004),
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_904TGR.pdf.
83. SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEWIDE INITIATIVE GUIDE 1 (2011), http://www.sos.ca.gov
/elections/ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-guide.pdf.
84. There have been a number of lawsuits challenging just how impartial or accurate these
attorney general titles and summaries actually are. See John Diaz, Loading the Ballot Language,
SFGATE, Jan. 29, 2012, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/diaz/article/Loading-the-ballot-language
-2759736.php#page-1. Partisan attorney generals have been known to be selective in their
descriptions and use loaded language to sway voters one way or another. Id.
85. Id.
86. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
87. Id. § 8(c).
88. About Ballot Arguments, SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION
GUIDE, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/voter-info/about-ballot-arguments.htm (last visited Feb. 6,
2013).
89. Id.

770

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:755

Furthermore, a proposed initiative may not encompass more
than one subject—the “single-subject” rule.90 An initiative also may
not exempt a district from its effects based upon either the measure’s
approval or rejection or the percentage of votes cast in the district.
Nor may an initiative contain any alternative provisions which would
become law “depending upon the casting of a specified percentage of
votes for or against the measure.”91 No individual may be named to
office via an initiative, nor may a private corporation be named to
perform any function or duty.92 Finally, an initiative may only amend
the constitution, not propose revisions to it.93 This Article focuses
only on the two main constitutional restrictions on the initiative—the
single-subject rule and the revision-amendment distinction—as well
as the legislature’s limited ability to amend an initiative statute.
D. Structure of the Initiative
From its days as an idealistic tool of the Progressive movement,
the ballot initiative has grown into a force to be reckoned with in
California politics.94 Since its inception, a total of 1,759 initiatives
have been proposed for the California ballot, and 360 of them have
been submitted to the voters.95 Counting both legislative and
initiative amendments, the court in Strauss noted that the California
Constitution has been amended more than 500 times since 1879.96 At
one point, the California Constitution had ballooned to 95,000 words,
making it one of the largest governing instruments in the world,
although it has been trimmed somewhat since then.97 In contrast, the
U.S. Constitution consists of only 7,818 words and has been
amended only sixteen times since the Bill of Rights in 1791.98
90. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
91. Id. §§ 8(e)–(f).
92. Id. § 12.
93. Id. art. XVIII, § 3.
94. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1190 (“[The initiative] is the driving force in California
politics and lawmaking.”).
95. History of California Initiatives: Initiative Totals by Year, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF
STATE DEBRA BOWEN, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/history-initiatives-info
.htm (follow “Initiative Totals by Year” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
96. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60 (2009).
97. Pat Ooley, State Governance: An Overview of the History of Constitutional Provisions
Dealing with State Governance, in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMITTEE,
CONSTITUTION REVISION HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE 3, 6 (1996), http://www
.californiacityfinance.com/CCRChistory.pdf.
98. Id.
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Nowadays, the transformation of the initiative process from a
tool to curb special interests and ensconced, unscrupulous politicians
to a preferred tool of those same special interests and politicians and
has led it to become something Governor Hiram Johnson would
barely recognize.99 Initiatives, long considered the primary tool of
grassroots organizations striving for change against established
powers, are now commonly used by “well-heeled special interests”
to push for favorable change in state law.100 Indeed, even the
Southern Pacific Railroad contributed $500,000 to an environmental
bond initiative in the hopes of receiving some of the bond funds to
upgrade its own tracks with public money.101 Attempts to stiffen the
requirements of the initiative power to make it more difficult to
amend the state constitution, such as by increasing the number of
voter signatures required, have failed.102 Given how dominant and
widespread the initiative process has become in California politics, it
seems that the initiative as a powerful, driving legislative force is
here to stay.103
1. The Revision-Amendment Distinction
Even before the birth of the initiative power, courts long held
that the electorate could only amend the constitution, not effect a
revision to it.104 Revisions were considered such fundamental
changes to the constitution that they were only proper in the setting
of a constitutional convention called by the people.105 Over the
course of the century since the initiative power granted the people
direct lawmaking power, courts have refined the distinction between
what constitutes a revision and what constitutes an amendment.106

99. Peter Schrag, Take the Initiative, Please: Referendum Madness in California, THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Dec. 19, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/tak-initiative-please
-referendum-madness-california.
100. Initiatives: Use and Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at M4.
101. Schrag, supra note 99.
102. Sanders, supra note 26.
103. Id.
104. See Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 425–26 (Cal. 1894).
105. Id.
106. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077
(Cal. 1990); Amador v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978); McFadden v.
Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
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a. Revision and amendment defined
California is one of many states with a dual-function
constitution—one both fundamental (or “constitutive”) and
legislative.107 Provisions deemed fundamental deal “with the frame
of and declaring the general principles of the republican form of
government.”108 A change to such a fundamental provision is known
as a revision.109 The revision process is “purposefully cumbersome to
implement”110 and requires calling a constitutional convention.111 In
contrast, the legislative function deals with “the law of the state”112
and encompasses all matters that a legislature and electorate
normally pass. The majority of the California Constitution’s 95,000
words fall under this heading and include regular legislature activity
as well as an unusually substantial number of initiative language,
ranging from tax codes to education funding to rate regulation—the
“everyday operations” of lawmakers.113 Changes to such legislative
provisions may be considered “amendments.”114 As noted above, the
initiative power is confined to the adoption of statutes and
constitutional amendments only.115
The California Supreme Court first clarified the distinction
between a revision and an amendment in Livermore v. Waite,116 over
a decade before the initiative power was written into the California
Constitution. The court described the difference between a
constitutional revision and an amendment passed by the legislature
thus:
The legislature is not authorized to assume the function of a
constitutional convention, and propose for adoption by the
people a revision of the entire constitution under the form of
an amendment . . . . The very term “constitution” implies an
instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the
provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Manheim, supra note 11, at 1220.
Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Los Angeles County, 132 P. 282, 283 (Cal. 1913).
Manheim, supra note 11, at 1221–22.
Id. at 1221.
CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 132 P. at 283.
See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1221–22.
Id.
CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894).
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of the people that the underlying principles upon which it
rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument,
shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the
other hand, the significance of the term “amendment”
implies such an addition or change within the lines of the
original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better
carry out the purpose for which it was framed . . . [and] the
changed condition of affairs . . . or the changes of society or
time, may demand an enlargement of some of these
limitations, or an extended application of its principles.117
It was not until decades later that the court held the same
distinction set forth in Livermore applied not only to ballot matters
put forward by the legislature but also to initiatives.118 The Great
Depression and the resulting turmoil it brought to California gave
rise to the “ham-and-eggs” initiatives of the late 1930s and 1940s, a
movement ostensibly tailored to fighting for the rights of the
elderly.119 The most famous of these initiatives was a 21,000-word
behemoth entitled the “California Bill of Rights” that the California
Supreme Court removed from the ballot in McFadden v. Jordan,
three months before the election.120 The ballot measure at issue in
McFadden was a prime example of an initiative that affected the
“substantial entirety” of the constitution and a wide variety of
functions, and thus was not an acceptable use of the initiative
power.121 Given that the initiative contained 208 sections and
repealed or altered fifteen of twenty-five existing articles, it was not
surprising that the court held the initiative effected “such extensive
alterations in the basic plan and substance of our present
Constitution” as to constitute an improper revision to it.122

117. Id. at 426.
118. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
119. For an illuminating look at the history and trends that contributed to the rise of the
“ham-and-eggs” movement see R. Michael Alvarez et. al., The “Ham and Eggs” Movement in
Southern California: Public Opinion on Economic Redistribution in the 1938 Campaign (Ctr. for
the Study of Law and Politics, Working Paper No. 12, 2003), available at http://lawweb
.usc.edu/centers/cslp/assets/docs/cslp-wp-012.pdf.
120. 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
121. Id. at 797.
122. Id.
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b. The two-pronged modern revision-amendment analysis
The modern analysis of the revision-amendment distinction was
set forth with clarity thirty years after McFadden in Amador Valley
Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization.123
To provide a more helpful roadmap to determine whether a particular
constitutional enactment is a revision or an amendment, the
California Supreme Court in that case developed a two-part analysis
that looked to both the quantitative and qualitative effects of the
proposition.124 An initiative that is “so extensive in its provisions as
to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the Constitution by the
deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions” constitutes a
quantitative revision.125 The initiative in McFadden is a textbook
case of a proposition that effects such wholesale change to the
constitution as to be a quantitative revision under the Amador
standard.126
A qualitative enactment may also prove to be unconstitutional,
assuming it “accomplish[es] such far reaching changes in the nature
of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.”127 A
change from republican governance to direct democracy, or a
measure preventing local governments from controlling their own
affairs or finances free of interference by the state legislature, would
be an example of an impermissible qualitative revision.128 These
types of fundamental changes to government structure, or
impingements on essential constitutional rights, could only be
effected through the political power of a constitutional convention,
not by an initiative.129
Consider the case of Proposition 13, a 1978 initiative that’s main
purpose was to require a two-thirds legislative majority for the
passage of any new tax.130 The court found that, despite the
considerable changes the proposition wrought in the area of taxation,
the changes functioned narrowly enough to institute a new method of
taxation and held that such a limited purpose was well within the
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

583 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Cal. 1978).
Id. at 1286.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1287.
Manheim, supra note 11, at 1226.
Amador, 583 P.2d, at 1284.
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bounds of the people’s initiative power.131 The proposition only
affected one article of the constitution and thus was not a quantitative
revision.132 Furthermore, despite Proposition 13’s substantial change
to the state’s entire taxation mechanism and the new requirement of a
two-thirds vote for future tax changes, the court held that the
qualitative effect was neither substantial nor novel enough to
constitute a full-scale qualitative revision.133
In its decision, the court spoke glowingly of its mission to
“liberally construe[] [the initiative power] to promote the democratic
process,”134 emphasizing that the role of the initiative was to act as a
“legislative battering ram” which may be used to cut through normal
legislative red tape and “strike directly toward the desired end.”135
Despite the court’s downplaying the effect of Proposition 13,
however, the initiative severely hurt the ability of local governments
to tax and manage their own revenues, transferring much of that role
to the state government.136 In essence, Amador stated that it was
acceptable for an initiative to uphold “fairly dramatic alterations in
the distribution of powers.”137 Nevertheless, even these dramatic
alterations were viewed as operating merely “within a relatively
narrow range to accomplish a new system of taxation”—certainly a
novel change, but not a prohibitively substantial one in the court’s
eyes.138
Aside from McFadden, the only other time the court has struck
down a proposition for constituting an impermissible revision was in
Raven v. Deukmejian.139 The proposition at issue in that case,
Proposition 115, was known as the “Crime Victims Justice Reform
Act” and consisted of numerous comprehensive reforms ostensibly
related to the criminal justice system.140 One such change qualified

131. Id. at 1289.
132. Id. at 1286.
133. Id. at 1289.
134. Id. at 1283.
135. Id. at 1289.
136. The two-thirds vote requirement Proposition 13 instituted for the passage of any new
taxes created “an insurmountable obstacle built on populist allergy to any kind of new levy.”
Kevin O’Leary, The Legacy of Proposition 13, TIME, June 27, 2009, http://www.time.com/time
/nation/article/0,8599,1904938,00.html.
137. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1226.
138. Amador v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1289 (Cal. 1978).
139. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
140. Id. at 1079.
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Article I, Section 24141 by stating that specific criminal procedural
rights in the state constitution “shall be construed by the courts of
this state in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United
States.”142 The intended effect was to prevent California courts from
interpreting the state constitution as granting criminal defendants
more expansive rights than they enjoyed under the federal
Constitution.143 The court found that this single change was an illegal
revision under the qualitative Amador prong.144
While the Amador court approved Proposition 13’s profound
alteration of California’s taxation systems,145 it jealously guarded its
own independent interpretive powers in Raven, calling Proposition
115’s effect on that power “devastating.”146 It explained that
Proposition 115 would “severely limit[] the independent force and
effect of the California Constitution”147 such as to “substantially
change our preexisting governmental framework”;148 that is, effect a
qualitative revision. It seems that the court’s own independent
interpretative power is not to be disturbed, despite the fact that
deferring to the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting state
constitutional language that is similar to federal constitutional
language is nothing new.149 This is especially interesting in light of

141. “Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
142. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086.
143. Id. at 1087. By the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court had started to substantially curtail the
constitutional rights developed by the Warren Court. Interview with Karl M. Manheim, Professor,
Loyola Law Sch., in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 24, 2013). Many state courts began resorting to state
constitutional rights as a way to preserve the status quo. Id. Proposition 115 was one such
example, an initiative designed to stop a practice of more expansive criminal rights. Id. Another
technique involved strong and often virulent attacks against sitting justices on the state supreme
court, which is what happened to Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other associate justices in
1986. Larry D. Hatfield, Ex-Chief Justice Rose Bird Dies, SFGATE, Dec. 5, 1999, http://www
.sfgate.com/news/article/Ex-Chief-Justice-Rose-Bird-dies-3055490.php#page-1. The campaign
was a direct result of the justices’ stance against the death penalty. Id. Seen against this backdrop,
Raven v. Deukmejian can be seen as the California Supreme Court striking back. Interview with
Karl M. Manheim, Professor, Loyola Law Sch., in L.A., Cal. (Jan. 24, 2013).
144. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1087–88.
145. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281,
1289 (Cal. 1978).
146. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1087.
147. Id. at 1088.
148. Id. at 1086.
149. Id. at 1088.
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the court’s previous acceptance of initiatives that constricted the
judiciary’s power.150
c. Narrowing of the qualitative prong
Strauss v. Horton151 narrowed what it meant for an initiative to
work a revision under the qualitative prong.152 Proposition 8, at issue
in Strauss, was a voter initiative that arose as a response to the
court’s holding in In re Marriage Cases153 that same-sex couples
enjoyed the same fundamental right to marry, under the state
constitution, as did opposite-sex couples.154 Accordingly, to overrule
that case, opponents of same-sex marriage had to remove that
constitutional protection.155 Proposition 8 did just that, adding the
following section to the California Constitution: “Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”156
Opponents of Proposition 8 raised the issue that the initiative
constituted an impermissible revision of the constitution, as it
abridged a right that the court had just declared fundamental under
the privacy and due process rights of the constitution.157 The court,
however, disagreed, holding that a change to the constitution can
only be considered a qualitative revision when it affects
governmental organization and structure and not when the change is
one that affects a fundamental principle of social organization like
equal protection.158
As it stands now, the court’s technical approach to
distinguishing between what constitutes a permissible amendment
and what constitutes an impermissible revision allows for the
150. See In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985); People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587 (Cal.
1979). In re Lance W. challenged the 1982 Proposition 8 restriction of the judicially created
exclusionary rule as an improper revision, but the court held it to be a mere amendment and in
doing so implicitly authorized the people to prescribe rules of procedure and of evidence. 694
P.2d at 752. The initiative at issue in People v. Frierson added a provision to the California
Constitution declaring the death penalty not to be cruel or unusual punishment—preventing the
judiciary from interpreting the cruel and unusual standard itself—and was said to be an
amendment, not a revision. 599 P.2d at 613–14. However, only three justices signed the lead
opinion on the case. Id.
151. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
152. Id. at 114.
153. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
154. Id. at 385.
155. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 59.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 127 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
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removal of a fundamental constitutional right (even one recently
classified as such by the same court) from a minority group by a
majority vote.159 In other words, the very idea of protecting minority
rights from majority impairment is subject to majority rule.160 The
court has not hesitated, however, to strike down an amendment that
attempts to reduce the court’s own powers, like independent judicial
review, as an impermissible modification of government structure or
organization.161 Presently, the court’s formalistic analysis of the
revision-amendment distinction does not follow the same spirit as the
constitutional safeguards first put in place by California’s
founders.162
2. The “Single-Subject” Rule
The single-subject rule prevents an initiative from being
submitted to voters if it covers more than one issue.163 The rule was
designed to prevent overly complex measures from confusing the
electorate, whether through deceptive ballot descriptions or the sheer
amount of text often present within an initiative.164 However, the
California Supreme Court’s lax treatment of the single-subject rule
over the years has made the rule a virtually toothless restriction.165
As it stands today, the single-subject rule remains a toothless bar to
the passage of an initiative.166

159. Ngo, supra note 16, at 247.
160. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
161. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087 (Cal. 1990).
162. “[G]overnment was instituted for the protection of minorities [and] [t]he majority of any
community . . . [is] to be restrained from infringing upon the rights of the minority.” J. ROSS
BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION
OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849 22 (1850) (statement by
delegate William Gwin in an effort to involve the minority populations in the drafting of a state
constitution). “The drafters of our Constitution never imagined, nor would they have approved, a
rule that gives the foundational principles of social organization in free societies, such as equal
protection, less protection from hasty, unconsidered change than principles of governmental
organization.” Strauss, 207 P.3d at 124 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
163. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
164. Marilyn E. Minger, Putting the “Single” Back in the Single-Subject Rule: A Proposal for
Initiative Reform in California, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 879, 879–80 (1991).
165. Id. at 880.
166. Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of Initiatives by the California Supreme Court, 2000–2010,
44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 659, 661 (2011).
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a. Creation and purpose of the single-subject rule
Article II, Section 8(d) of the California Constitution holds that
“[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be
submitted to the electors or have any effect.”167 The bloated
proposition at issue in McFadden led directly to the passage of this
amendment.168 The idea of a single-subject rule, however, was not
new169 and had been a part of the legislature’s lawmaking process for
decades.170 The single-subject rule was intended to eliminate “the
possibility of such confusion inasmuch as it will limit each proposed
amendment to one subject and one subject only.”171 Indeed, the
single-subject rule has long attempted to accomplish two goals: (1)
reducing voter confusion;172 and (2) preventing two or more
dissimilar measures from being combined into a single act to
facilitate its passage through a governing body that might otherwise
more carefully scrutinize the separate provisions.173 Without
stringent enforcement of a single-subject rule, courts must instead
assume that voters understand all the various complexities and
effects of a ballot measure.174
b. The reasonably germane test:
A broad application of the single-subject rule
The court’s first opinion applying the single-subject rule set the
tone for how it would interpret the rule for the next sixty years: as

167. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
168. The California Supreme Court decided McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948),
on August 3, 1948. The ballot measure adding the single-subject rule to the constitution was
approved on March 26, 1948. See id. for a discussion of the initiative.
169. Consider the Roman law Lex Caecilia Didia, which first prohibited lex satura, or laws
containing unrelated provisions, in 98 B.C. Kurt G Kastorf, Logrolling Gets Logrolled: Same-Sex
Marriage, Direct Democracy, and the Single-Subject Rule, 54 EMORY L.J. 1633, 1640 (2005).
The first American single-subject rule came about in 1844 in New Jersey and soon became a
fixture in many other states. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7 para. 4; Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall
Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REV. 389, 389–90 (1958).
170. See CAL. CONST. art IV, § 9. There is, however, one important difference between the
two rules in that the legislature must state the subject in the title of a bill, whereas an initiative
does not have such a requirement. Compare CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9 with CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 8 (highlighting that while the legislature must state the subject in the title of a bill, an initiative
does not have such a requirement).
171. Id.
172. A “mismatch between voters’ perception of what an initiative does and that measure’s
actual effect.” Kastorf, supra note 169, at 1641.
173. This practice is known as “logrolling.” See id.
174. Uelmen, supra note 166, at 662.
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broadly and as expansively as possible.175 The court in Perry v.
Jordan held that
[p]rovisions governing projects so related and
interdependent as to constitute a single scheme may be
properly included within a single act . . . [and] [t]he
Legislature may insert in a single act all legislation germane
to the general subject as expressed in its title and within the
field of legislation suggested thereby.176
This language is known as the “reasonably germane” requirement
and was borrowed from an interpretation of the legislative singlesubject rule.177 The “reasonably germane” test is the guidepost for all
of the court’s subsequent decisions regarding the initiative singlesubject rule.178
The court showed just how relaxed a “general subject” could be
in Brosnahan v. Brown.179 The proposition at issue in that case, also
called Proposition 8,180 was a multifaceted criminal justice reform
measure aimed specifically at strengthening and bolstering the rights
of those affected by crime.181 While much of the proposition dealt
with victims’ rights, bail, diminished capacity, truth-in-evidence,
prior
convictions,
plea
bargaining,
and
other
such
“criminal justice”-related provisions, section 28, subdivision (c)
declared the “inalienable right [of public school students and staff] to
attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.”182 Petitioners
in the case argued that such a right is an “undefined, amorphous
concept,” which was not sufficiently tethered to the idea of criminal
justice reform to fall within the single-subject of the proposition.183
The court, however, disagreed.184 Upholding the “reasonably
germane” standard articulated in Perry, the court held that

175. Perry v. Jordan, 207 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1949) (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (Cal. 1932).
178. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1208.
179. 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982).
180. Not to be confused with the Proposition 8 later at issue in Strauss. See Strauss v. Horton,
207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
181. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 280.
182. Id. at 278.
183. Petitioners noted that the right to safe schools is one that could fall under any number of
divergent hazards from acts of nature and acts of war to more mundane ones like building code
violations. Id. at 280.
184. Id. at 281.
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Proposition 8’s safe-schools provision sufficiently “aimed at, and
[was] limited to[] the single subject of safety from criminal
behavior.”185 The court noted that its own precedent on the issue had
painted the single-subject rule in broad swaths,186 and to construe the
single-subject rule any more tightly would contradict the court’s
stated mission to “avoid an overly strict judicial application of the
single-subject requirement, . . . frustrat[ing] legitimate efforts by the
people to accomplish integrated reform measures.”187 Yet the
purpose of the single-subject rule is to prevent such “integrated
reform measures” that may constitute logrolling or cause greater
voter confusion with complex, tenuously related provisions.188
The past decade has confirmed that the single-subject rule
remains a virtual nonentity.189 In Manduley v. Superior Court,190 the
court held that Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile
Crime Prevention Act of 1998, did not violate the single-subject
rule.191 Although Proposition 21 ostensibly dealt strictly with gang
violence and juvenile crime, the measure added a number of
amendments to the constitution, expanding the “Three Strikes” law
to include several offenses that were not related to gang violence or
any other sort of juvenile crime.192 Instead of analyzing whether
these provisions were in fact reasonably germane to the subject of
gang violence and juvenile crime, the court noted that the attorney
general’s summary of Proposition 21 explicitly designated the
additional crimes as violent and serious felonies, automatically
making them worthy of longer sentences.193 The court held that no
voters could have been fooled, fulfilling one of the primary purposes
of the single-subject rule. Therefore, the court reasoned, all of the
185. Id.
186. The court specifically recalled its discussion of the legislative single-subject rule in
Evans v. Superior Court. Brosnahan. Id. at 280. There, the court had upheld a measure that
included a number of disparate subjects including wills, succession details, administration and
distribution of decedents’ estates, and the roles and procedures of guardianships of minors and
incompetents and found that they were all reasonably germane to probate law. See Evans v.
Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467 (Cal. 1932).
187. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 283 (quoting Amador v. State Board of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281 (Cal. 1978)).
188. Minger, supra note 164, at 908–09.
189. Id. at 880.
190. 41 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2002).
191. Id. at 9.
192. Uelmen, supra note 166, at 661.
193. Manduley, 41 P.3d at 31.
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provisions were “reasonably germane to the common purpose of
reducing gang-related and juvenile crime.”194 Justice Moreno
concurred but noted the obvious problem inherent in the court’s
analysis of Manduley: simply put, it is unrealistic to assume that
voters carefully scrutinize their ballot guides and understand the
measures they are voting on.195
The single-subject rule remains a lightly regarded rule, one the
court would prefer to apply broadly for fear of restricting the
people’s experiment with direct democracy.196
3. The Legislature’s “Ability” to Amend Initiatives
Unless an initiative expressly provides for it, the California
legislature may not amend initiative statutes by passing another
statute.197 California is the only ballot-initiative state that restricts the
legislature from amending an initiative statute,198 a reminder of just
how deeply seated California’s distrust of the legislature was when
the initiative process was first instituted.199 Courts have honored this
restriction quite deferentially, in a nod to the judicial view that the
electorate’s power to enact direct legislation is a fundamental right
that should be left undisturbed by the legislature.200 For practical
reasons, however, initiative drafters have long permitted the
legislature to amend an initiative if the amendment “furthers” the
initiative’s “purposes.”201 The traditional rationale is that it is more
efficient to allow the legislature to provide technical fixes to
amendments than to hold another inconvenient, expensive election
just to amend a poorly worded statute.202
What exactly constitutes a statute that “furthers the purpose” of
an initiative amendment? In Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v.
Wilson,203 the court had to answer this question to determine whether
194. Id. at 33.
195. Id. at 38–39 (Moreno, J., concurring).
196. Minger, supra note 164, at 880.
197. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c).
198. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1197.
199. Id.
200. See Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1995) (quoting Associated Home Builders
v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976)); Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v.
Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 799 P.2d 1220, 1235 (Cal. 1990).
201. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1199.
202. Id.
203. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1120 (Cal. 1995). Proposition 103 essentially
included a cutback of insurance rates to 80 percent of the rate from the year prior to the
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a legislative amendment to the recently passed Proposition 103
actually “furthered the purpose” of the initiative’s stated goal of
insurance reform. The court held that the limitation that the
legislature’s statutory amendment to the initiative must further its
purpose necessarily requires a heightened level of judicial review,
lest the legislature be able to subvert the entire process by weakening
initiative statutes once they are enacted.204 The court also noted in
dicta that a heightened review was necessary to prevent future
initiative drafters from feeling compelled to remove the legislature’s
ability to amend the initiative entirely.205 The court explained that
while the legislative power is generally absolute, it is diminished
where the constitution has established limitations upon that power.206
Such restrictions must be strictly construed.207 Under a heightened
review, the court quickly shot down Amwest’s argument that the
amendment, by clarifying whether the proposition applied to surety
insurance, did, indeed, further the initiative’s purpose; instead, the
court concluded, the legislature had “altered its terms in a significant
respect.”208
By applying a heightened standard of review to the question of
whether the legislature’s statutory amendment was permissible, the
judiciary essentially second-guessed the legislature’s policy
judgment.209 Furthermore, by setting strict limits on the legislature’s
ability to amend initiatives, the court unequivocally held that the
electorate’s legislative power is superior to that of the legislature.210
This has been expressly noted by the California Supreme Court.211
The partiality to the people’s direct power may be a result of the fact
that direct legislation is the closest the people can get to
self-governance, whereas the political power in Article II, Section 1

initiative’s passage. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.01, 1861.05 (West 2012). It also instituted a
strict rate approval system that required a notification to the public of the requested change and
prohibited any rate that was “excessive, inadequate, unfairly discriminatory or otherwise in
violation” of the code. Id. § 1861.05.
204. See Amwest, 906 P.2d at 1112, 1119.
205. Id. at 1119–20.
206. Id. (quoting Martin v. Riley, 123 P.2d 488 (Cal. 1942)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1123.
209. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1199.
210. Id. at 1202.
211. “The people’s reserved power of initiative is greater than the power of the legislative
body.” Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 574 (1995).
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of the constitution is merely theoretical self-governance
accomplished by representatives, not the people directly.212
III. THE UNCONTROLLABLE INITIATIVE
The California Supreme Court has loosely applied important
principles governing the initiative power and has been notably
unsuccessful in reining in the initiative process.213 This has led to an
electorate power that seems to have very few actual restrictions and
that sabotages the original purposes of the initiative.214
Furthermore, if both direct democracy and republicanism have a
place in California government, then the distinctions and relationship
between the two should be pronounced and easily discernible. As it
stands now, they are not.215 Due to the court’s loose refereeing of the
initiative system, bare voter majorities may do as they please,
upsetting the balance between direct democracy and the checks-andbalances system of republican government.216 Unfettered initiative
power creates a majoritarian direct democracy model that threatens
to subvert the ideal of a republican government, which is structured
to protect the rights of all within the government equally, not at the
expense of one majority-minority faction or another.217
A. The Court’s Regulation of the Initiative Has Rendered the
Initiative’s Boundaries Practically Nonexistent
The court’s interpretations of the single-subject rule and the
revision-amendment distinction are either so broad as to be a virtual
paper tiger or too formalistic and inflexible to adequately limit the
scope of the people’s power, as the framers of the initiative process
intended.218 The court’s strict regulation of the legislature’s power
under the “to further the purpose” doctrine, furthermore, has created
a legislature inferior in its power to that of the electorate’s.219 By
212. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1217.
213. See infra Part II.D.
214. See generally Bourne, supra note 78, at 3 (discussing the six original functions of the
initiative power as described by its creators).
215. See infra Part III.B.
216. See infra Part III.B.
217. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 606–07.
218. E.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077
(Cal. 1990); Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982); Amador Valley Joint Union High
Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978); see infra Part II.C.1–2.
219. E.g., Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112 (Cal. 1995); see infra Part II.C.3.
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maintaining these antiquated sets of technical definitions, the court
has sanctioned radical shifts in the distribution of legislative and
political powers and failed to stay true to the original progressive
spirit of the initiative.220
1. The Qualitative Test Was Read So Narrowly in Strauss as to
Defeat the Purpose of Separating a Revision from an Amendment
While the qualitative and quantitative prongs of Amador remain
a useful tool for determining whether an initiative is a revision or an
amendment, Strauss unnecessarily narrowed the qualitative test.221
This has created a shortsighted definition of “revision” and a political
arena where the initiative power has the authority to abrogate a
foundational constitutional principle of law.222 The ability of a bare
majority of a populace to remove a fundamental right previously
recognized under the constitution’s equal protection clause flies in
the face of basic republican theory and shows how the court, in
yielding to the will of the people, has subjected the California
Constitution to the whims of a majority interest.223
a. The current distinction between a revision and an
amendment is needlessly technical and shortsighted
By refusing to strictly construe a revision as one that affects a
fundamental constitutional principle such as equal protection, the
California Supreme Court is implicitly condoning direct majoritarian
lawmaking by the electorate without the regular deliberative
functions that legislative lawmaking allows.224 Bare majorities can
easily propose and pass legislation without regard to the interests,
concerns, or needs of others.225 This is direct democracy at its most
anti-republican—ignoring the common weal in favor of the

220. See infra Part III.A.4.
221. In short, an initiative may be considered an amendment if it affects a fundamental right
like privacy, due process, or equal protection, but will be voided as an impermissible revision if it
enacts a far-reaching change to governmental structure. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 102.
222. Recent Cases, Equal Protection—Same-Sex Marriage—California Supreme Court
Classifies Proposition 8 as “Amendment” Rather than “Revision,” 123 HARV. L. REV. 1516,
1518 (2010) [hereinafter Equal Protection].
223. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58, 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed. Penguin
Books 1987).
224. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 607.
225. Id. at 606.
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majority’s personal viewpoints and biases.226 Even if such legislation
were construed as merely a narrowly defined, limited exception, as
the term “marriage” was in Strauss, the approval of such a
measure—expressly discriminating against one group’s right to use a
specific term—is a sufficiently harmful mark to impose second-class
citizenship on that group.227 The court’s approval of Proposition 8 as
an amendment to the California Constitution sent a loud and clear
message not only to gay and lesbian Californians, but to all minority
groups—your rights, no matter how fundamental, may be erased
from the constitution at the whim of a bare majority of the
electorate.228
The court was wrong in Strauss to hold that a bare majority of
the electorate voting to take away a fundamental right is not a
revision of the California Constitution.229 The court’s verbal
gymnastics in the case tried to sidestep the fact that the court had
held the marriage right to be fundamental months earlier in In re
Marriage Cases.230 Based on the court’s logic, the equal protection
clause, long considered a fundamental part of the constitution,231
would be subject to the whims of legislative action.232 Laws
depriving Californians of fundamental rights could now be passed on
the basis of suspect classifications such as race or religion, as Strauss
did on the basis of sexual orientation.233
No matter how one defines the right being taken away, the
court’s narrow definition of “revision”—as applying only to changes
to a governmental plan or framework—seemed specially designed to
categorically exempt initiatives like Proposition 8.234 By changing
226. E-mail from Karl M. Manheim, Professor of Law, Loyola Law Sch., to author (Jan. 25,
2013, 4:44 PM) (on file with author).
227. Ngo, supra note 16, at 249.
228. Id.; see also ERIC AVILA, POPULAR CULTURE IN THE AGE OF WHITE FLIGHT: FEAR AND
FANTASY IN SUBURBAN LOS ANGELES 232 (2004) (discussing how the anti-tax initiative
Proposition 13, which effectively defunded a number of public schools, successfully passed
partially due to a large number of white parents pulling their kids out of public schools and
sending them to private schools as a result of desegregated school busing and equalized public
school funding).
229. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 49, 122 (Cal. 2009).
230. 183 P.3d 384, 433 (Cal. 2008).
231. “Equal protection principles lie at the core of the California Constitution and have been
embodied in that document from its inception.” Strauss, 207 P.3d at 129 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
232. Brief for Karl M. Manheim as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (Nos. S168047, S168066, S168078).
233. Id.
234. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 124 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
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the court’s earlier description of a qualitative revision from one that
includes a change in the basic plan of California government to one
that is a change in the basic plan of California government, Strauss
imprudently forecloses all other possible ways to effect a revision.235
Thus, a change to the constitution that does not affect the
constitution’s structure or framework must, by the court’s inflexible
and unflinching logic, be an amendment.236 This would still restrict
laws that change the role of the judiciary, a part of the “constitutional
scheme or framework” of government, as the proposition struck
down in Raven did.237 However, it opens other essential
constitutional principles to almost limitless attack by initiatives.238
b. The court’s formalistic, rigidly technical approach to
distinguishing permissible constitutional amendments from
impermissible constitutional revisions subverts
the goals of the constitution’s drafters
The drafters of California’s constitution wholeheartedly believed
that “government was instituted for the protection of minorities [and
that t]he majority of any community is . . . to be restrained from
infringing upon the rights of the minority.”239 By applying a
formalistic, carefully circumscribed definition to the term “revision,”
however, the court has done more than just “jealously [guarding] the
sovereign people’s initiative power”;240 it is yielding to the will of
the majority and subjecting the California Constitution to “the
turbulency and weakness of unruly passions.”241 As Justice
Werdegar noted in Strauss: “The drafters of our Constitution never
imagined, nor would they have approved, a rule that gives the
foundational principles of social organization in free societies, such
as equal protection, less protection from hasty, unconsidered change
than principles of governmental organization.”242 The idea that a
235. Id. at 125.
236. Id. at 134 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
237. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990).
238. Brief for Karl M. Manheim, supra note 232, at 23–24.
239. BROWNE, supra note 162, at 22 (statement by delegate William Gwin in an effort to
involve the minority populations in the drafting of a state constitution).
240. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 277 (Cal. 1982).
241. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
242. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 124 (Cal. 2009) (Werdegar, J., concurring). Despite
Justice Werdegar’s conclusion that the initiative could not modify fundamental constitutional
principles like equal protection, she nevertheless held that Proposition 8 did not affect equal
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mere majority of voters is enough to subvert a highly regarded,
implicitly American principle such as equal protection contrasts with
the basic goals of a constitution, which is meant to carry guarantees
that every citizen under its laws can count on.243
The court’s attempt to avoid these issues in Strauss244
contradicts its prior reasoning in In re Marriage Cases.245 No matter
how narrow or limited the court may have attempted to construe
Proposition 8 to be, its cutting away of a fundamental part of full
equality “strikes at the core of, and thus fundamentally alters, the
guarantee of equal treatment that has pervaded the California
Constitution since 1849.”246 Theoretically, a proposition that
prohibits usage of the term “marriage” by African-Americans or
Asian-Americans would be within the initiative power, assuming it
received more than 50 percent of the popular vote.247 Taken to its
logical conclusion, the court’s ruling in Strauss would enable the
electorate to restrict the right of assembly or the right to free
speech—say, banning the protest or criticism of government—of a
federally protected suspect class like African-Americans.248 In short,
what Strauss allows is the complete threatening of a minority group’s
rights, so long as it does not affect the court’s definition of what
constitutes the “structure” or “governmental plan” of the
constitution.249
Strauss is not consistent with the foundational principle of equal
protection in our government or the deeply rooted American concept
of allowing an independent judiciary to interpret and enforce the

protection because restricting access to the term “marriage” was simply “[d]isagreement over a
single, newly recognized, contested application of a general principle.” Id. at 128.
243. William N. Eskridge, Foreword: The Marriage Cases—Reversing The Burden of Inertia
in a Pluralist Constitutional Democracy, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1785, 1842 (2009).
244. By classifying Proposition 8 as a “narrow exception” the court simply reserved the term
marriage for opposite-sex couples and left all the substantive benefits of marriage for same-sex
couples under a nominal name such as “domestic partnership.” Strauss, 207 P.3d at 63.
245. Which quite accurately noted that “draw[ing] a distinction between the name for the
official family relationship of opposite-sex couples (marriage) and that for same-sex couples
(domestic partnership) impinges upon a same-sex couple’s fundamental interest in having their
family relationship accorded the same respect and dignity enjoyed by an opposite-sex couple. In
re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 782 (2008).
246. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 131 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
247. Ngo, supra note 16, at 252.
248. Id. at 248.
249. Id.
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constitution as it affects fundamental freedoms.250 Indeed, it stands in
stark contrast to Raven, where the court steadfastly protected its own
judicial power.251 The state judiciary jealously guards its precious
and private power to interpret the California Constitution as it sees
fit, unconstrained by federal courts or the initiative process.252 The
fact that the court did not see a structural constitutional feature like
equal protection as deserving the same safekeeping it affords itself
shows a disconcerting disconnect in the court’s reasoning and is an
inexplicably limited application of the qualitative prong of
Amador.253
2. The “Reasonably Germane” Single-Subject Rule
Is No Limitation at All
Under the current interpretation of the single-subject rule,
analyzing an initiative has become an increasingly complicated
calculation for the average voter.254 As the California Supreme Court
has interpreted it, the “reasonably germane” limitation is no
limitation at all.255 Far from preventing logrolling or reducing voter
confusion, this loose application of the single-subject rule has only
furthered opportunities for logrolling256 and has vastly increased the
potential for voter confusion.257
a. The “reasonably germane” standard
has furthered opportunities for logrolling
The court’s lax interpretation of the “reasonably germane”
standard has made it easier to mislead the electorate about the true,
full effects of a measure.258 Generally speaking, it is only those few
people who are intimately involved with a measure who have
zealously studied it and know how it will likely affect their own
interests.259 Most voters would not possess such information and
250. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 455 (Cal. 2008) (Kennard, J., concurring); see Brief
for Karl M. Manheim, supra note 232, at 25.
251. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990).
252. Id.
253. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 134 (Moreno, J., dissenting).
254. Minger, supra note 164, at 909.
255. See id. at 880.
256. Increasingly complex measures united under a nebulous concept increase the ease of
“burying unpopular riders in complex measures.” Id. at 908.
257. Id.
258. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 293 (Cal. 1982) (Bird, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 292.
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likely would not have the time or interest necessary to fully inform
themselves about a measure.260 The single-subject rule was intended
to clarify the effect of a proposition in comprehensible, concise
language, yet the court’s acceptance of broad, inchoate terms to
satisfy the rule has allowed logrolling to continue.261
By allowing disparate sections to be united under an
indeterminate, overly general term, the court has undermined one of
the main goals of the single-subject rule—preventing logrolling262—
and created a number of potential pitfalls.263 There is the potential
that voters will be oblivious to the total contents of an initiative’s
separate provisions.264 The combination of numerous provisions,
often affecting totally different parts of the constitution and effecting
various, unrelated changes under a nebulous heading, deprives voters
of their ability to vote independently on the merits of each separate
section.265 Furthermore, an unconstrained single-subject rule allows
an initiative to pass because of aggregated minorities who may
support separate provisions, not a true majority who favor any or all
of an initiative’s provisions—a populist analogue to the kind of
logrolling common in the legislature.266
Increasingly amorphous terms expand a general concept to the
point where any initiative can comply with the single-subject rule.267
The attorney general’s description of the proposition at issue in
Brosnahan noted that the Victims’ Bill of Rights included
“potential” as well as actual victims of crime—as dissenting Chief
Justice Bird noted, “‘potential victims’ of crime includes all of us in
virtually every aspect of our lives.”268 This could lead to an initiative
that may encompass “hundreds of unconnected statutes, countless

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Minger, supra note 164, at 885.
Id.
Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 293 (Bird, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also STANLEY R. KAMINSKI & ELINOR L. HART, BLOOMBERG BNA, LOG
ROLLING VERSUS THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE (2012), available at http://www.duanemorris.com
/articles/static/kaminski_hart_bloombergbna_022812.pdf (describing the process of logrolling in
the legislature and states’ attempts to deal with the process by legislative single-subject rule.
Much like the initiative single-subject rule, these restrictions often fail to curtail substantial
logrolling).
267. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 296 (Bird, J., dissenting).
268. Id.
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rules of court and volumes of judicial decisions, [and] completely
alter the complex interrelationships of our society.”269
Indeed, it is entirely possible that some voters in Brosnahan
intended to favor better protection for victims of crime without
favoring a repeal of numerous sections of the state’s Evidence Code,
some of which allowed victims of crime to be subjected to invasive
cross-examining involving their private lives.270 Instead of placing
these separate proposals in separate initiatives with their own, clearly
defined subjects, drafters deprived voters a chance to analyze,
discuss, and vote on the separate provisions—the exact opposite of
what the single-subject rule was supposed to accomplish regarding
logrolling.271 Far from restricting logrolling, California courts
actually promote its use by accepting umbrella terms such as
“potential victims” and “criminal justice” as appropriate singlesubject descriptions.272
While the legislative single-subject rule and the initiative
single-subject rule are similar in that they both present weak
obstacles to logrolling efforts,273 they differ as to what happens after
the bill is created.274 Legislation is constantly and consistently
amended between introduction and its eventual passage into law,
whether through careful compromise or extensive deliberation.275
Initiatives, on the other hand, are campaigned for and voted on, but
go through no amendatory process and remain virtually the same
from creation to the ballot box.276 Thus, while both single-subject
rules appear similar on the surface, the initiative is still far away
from the realities of legislative lawmaking.277 It would require a
stricter application of the single-subject rule to bring the initiative
power in line with the rule’s purpose and provide a counterpart to the
deliberative process a republican legislature already goes through.278
269. Id.
270. Id. at 300.
271. Id. at 300–01.
272. Id. at 297.
273. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
274. E-mail from Karl M. Manheim, Professor of law, Loyola Law Sch., to author (Jan. 25,
2013, 17:13 PST) (on file with author); see also infra notes 354–57 and accompanying text
(discussing other differences between the legislative single-subject rule and the initiative’s
single-subject rule).
275. See sources cited supra note 273.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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b. The “reasonably germane” standard has vastly increased
the potential for voter confusion
The court’s adoption of the broad, “reasonably germane”
legislative single-subject standard of Evans,279 although not
surprising,280 has had the unfortunate effect of obfuscating the full
purpose of many initiatives.281 One can easily imagine a voter
reading the preamble of the initiative at issue in Brosnahan, which
stated that the proposition was intended “to strengthen procedural
and substantive safeguards for victims in our criminal justice
system,”282 and voting for that worthy cause without knowing all of
the myriad components that may fall under such a generous heading
or the costs associated with them.
When confronted with a multifaceted proposition tackling many
subjects, like those at issue in Brosnahan, the average voter must
make a series of complex calculations to sufficiently weigh the
initiative’s pros and cons.283 It is true that every law involves such a
weighing process,284 but the current single-subject rule only confuses
that analysis by allowing many different issues to be put to a single
vote.285 Instead of preserving the initiative power of the people and
their right to be fully informed before voting, the judicial
interpretation of the “reasonably germane” standard promotes
279. See Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (Cal. 1932).
280. “[T]he [single-subject] provision is not to receive a narrow or technical construction in
all cases, but is to be construed liberally to uphold proper legislation . . . .” Perry v. Jordan, 207
P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1948). Much as the California Supreme Court is reluctant to intrude on the
legislative right to legislate, so does the court not wish to impinge on the expressly reserved
legislative power of the electorate. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Cal.
1995).
281. This stands in stark contrast to the single-subject rule’s original purpose—the original
pamphlet describing the proposed single-subject rule in 1948 noted that “[t]he busy voter does not
have the time to devote to the study of long, wordy, propositions and must rely upon such sketchy
information as may be received through the press, radio, or picked up in general conversation.”
CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE, BALLOT PAMPHLET 8 (1948); see supra Part
III.A.2.a.
282. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 280 (Cal. 1982).
283. Minger, supra note 164, at 909.
284. See Daniel Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 936, 958 (1983) (noting that weighing the positives and negatives of something is “inherent
in the passage of most laws”).
285. Minger, supra note 164, at 908–09 (“For example, when multiple subjects are presented
by provisions A, B, and C in a single initiative, the voter cannot merely decide if she likes or
dislikes provision A or provision B—she must decide if she likes provision A more than she
dislikes provision B or if she dislikes provision B more than she likes provisions A and C
combined.”).
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deception by initiative drafters.286 Far from narrowing an initiative’s
breadth, this judicial approach encourages drafters to lump dissimilar
provisions under an uninformative catchphrase.287 Furthermore, it
allows initiative sponsors to slip in potentially undesired provisions
that fit under the umbrella term, infringing on a voter’s freedom of
choice.288 All of these problems go against the spirit of the
single-subject rule, which directly attempted to avoid the dangers
inherent in propositions overloaded with separate issues.289
Despite the obvious difficulty the average voter has in
accurately digesting modern-day initiatives,290 the California
Supreme Court seems determined to convince itself that voters are
well prepared to deal with such multifaceted proposals.291 According
to the court, so long as an initiative’s provisions are “reasonably
germane” to one another, there can be no possibility of voter
confusion.292 To put it lightly, this is a gross overestimation of voter
knowledge.293 The average voter is exposed only to the official
materials in the ballot pamphlet and generally has no knowledge of
the origin or the significance of the language describing an
initiative’s law.294 Unlike the legislative process, where a bill must
pass through legislative debate and public hearings before it is
passed, an initiative does not pass through such a rigorous system: it
is presented to the voter as is.295 The voter receives a pamphlet
containing pages and pages of material, usually written by lawyers
and described in technicalities and with titles that often have little to

286. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 293–94 (Bird, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 293.
288. Id.
289. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
290. See Araceli MartÃnez Ortega, Busting Through Ballot Confusion in California, NEW
AM. MEDIA (Oct. 24, 2012), http://newamericamedia.org/2012/10/busting-through-ballot
-confusion-clear-explanations-of-key-cas-initiatives.php.
291. See Uelmen, supra note 166, at 661–62.
292. “Generally, the drafters who frame an initiative statute and the voters who enact it may
be deemed to be aware of the judicial construction of the law that served as its source.” In re
Harris, 775 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Cal. 1989). “We must assume the voters duly considered and
comprehended these materials.” Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 32 (Cal. 2002) (quoting
Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Cal. 1990)).
293. Stephen H. Sutro, Interpretation of Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Canons
of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945, 968
(1994).
294. Id.
295. Minger, supra note 164, at 926.
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do with what the initiative actually seeks to achieve.296 For the
average voter unfamiliar with the intricacies of an initiative, this
simply is not a practical way to learn enough to make an informed
decision.297 Voters are not experienced in interpreting the numerous
proposals that make up a modern initiative in a manner that would
allow them to avoid confusion.298 They do not have the time or
resources necessary to devote themselves to studying propositions—
often long, wordy, and containing unfamiliar language.299 This leads
to initiatives passed without the full understanding of the people who
passed them.300
This problem arises from the court’s original error of
commingling the legislative single-subject rule of Evans with the
new initiative single-subject rule.301 Simply put, the two are too
different to be used in the same way.302 The legislative single-subject
rule has a title requirement; the initiative does not.303 A violation of
the single-subject rule in the legislature will invalidate the part of a
bill not covered by the title; a violation in an initiative will void the
entire proposition.304 The judicial practice of taking the same “canon
of construction” that embodies the legislative single-subject rule and
applying it to the initiative single-subject rule assumes that those
who voted on the initiative single-subject rule knew of the previous
single-subject rule and had the “intent for uniformity and
consistency.”305 This presumption ignores the electorate’s reality and
its limited time to sift through endless, confusingly worded
paperwork, and assumes their intent for the same standard.306
Thus, when courts fail to account for how the electorate
analyzes and understands an initiative’s text and purpose, they also
fail to account for the electorate’s intent in passing the initiative.307
296. Ortega, supra note 290.
297. Id.
298. Sutro, supra note 293, at 973.
299. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 281, at 8–9.
300. Uelmen, supra note 166, at 670.
301. Sutro, supra note 293, at 966.
302. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8, with CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
303. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d), with CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
304. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d) (“An initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not . . . have any effect.”), with CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (“If a statute embraces a
subject not expressed in its title, only the part not expressed is void.”).
305. Sutro, supra note 293, at 966.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 971–72.
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The electorate may intend the general purpose without meaning to
affirm each component part of the initiative.308 This in turn leads to
further, reckless expansion of government, as voters turn to new
ballot measures to overcome the unforeseen problems raised by old
ones.309 Instead of acting as a limit on the draftsmen of initiative
measures, the single-subject rule has evolved into a phantom
restriction, one that allows initiative proposals to be presented in a
format that prevents voters from making fully informed decisions.310
Until the court adjusts its definition of the “reasonably germane”
standard, the single-subject rule will remain a toothless constitutional
relic, one that hardly prevents voters from being misled as to the
effects of a proposition and subverts the rule’s original purpose.311
3. The Judiciary’s Heightened Standard of Review for
Legislative Amending of Initiatives Threatens to
Further Marginalize the Legislature’s Power
The court’s deference to the initiative power and its strict review
of any legislative statute that attempts to amend an initiative have
essentially made the electorate’s political power greater than that of
the legislature.312 By applying a strict standard of review to
legislative amendments of initiative statutes while retaining only a
rational basis review of legislative amendments to the legislature’s
own statutes, the court has made it difficult for the legislature to
operate effectively or efficiently.313 The legislature is helpless to
modify initiatives as needed, aside from the strict adherence to the
“to further the purpose” doctrine.314 The initiative power effectively
hamstrings the legislative branch of government.315
The initiative is a political power that is “reserved” by the
people, not expressly delegated to the people.316 Thus, as a reserved
308. Id.
309. Ray Ring, Western Voters Love Ballot Initiatives—and Sometimes Make A Mess, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2011, http://www.hcn.org/issues/43.18/western-voters-love-ballot
-initiatives-and-sometimes-make-a-mess/print_view.
310. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 301 (Cal. 1982) (Bird, J., dissenting).
311. CAL. OFFICE OF SEC’Y OF STATE, BALLOT PAMPHLET 8–9 (1948).
312. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1202.
313. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Top Judge Calls Calif. Government ‘Dysfunctional’, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/us/11calif.html?_r=0.
314. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112, 1119–20 (Cal. 1995).
315. Steinhauer, supra note 313.
316. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1; art. IV, § 1 (West, Westlaw through all 2012 Reg. Sess.
laws, Gov. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 2011–2012, and all propositions on 2012 ballots).
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form of political power, it should be subject to some limits, as is
every other branch of government.317 For example, the exercise of
popular sovereignty—best represented in the twin constitutional
conventions California held in the latter half of the nineteenth
century—is inherent in the people and allows them to create and
regulate government institutions.318 The people’s initiative power, on
the other hand, is a subset of popular sovereignty, not equal to the
full exercise of political power inherent in a constitutional
convention but similar to another subset of political power like the
legislature’s ability to pass bills.319 As such, it should be subject to
strictly defined limits, as is the government.320 The court’s
heightened scrutiny under the “further the purpose” standard of
review for legislative amendments of initiative statutes, even if
legitimate,321 has essentially made this subset of popular sovereignty
an overwhelmingly powerful force in California politics, to the
detriment of the other branches of government.322 In a so-called
republican system of government, this tremendous deference to the
exercise of the initiative power veers dangerously close to full-blown
direct democracy instead of the limited power originally envisioned
by the constitutional text.323
Although California has long adhered to the idea that ultimate
power lies in the people,324 the court’s overriding deference to the
initiative power and its positioning of this power on a higher plane
than the legislature’s has blurred the separation of powers essential in
a republican government.325 Much as the court is within its rights
when it considers state action and reviews initiatives for
constitutionality,326 the legislature’s ability to amend legislation—
317. See Ngo, supra note 16, at 260.
318. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1190–92.
319. Id. at 1195.
320. Id. at 1195–96.
321. The judiciary has largely ignored the legislature’s portrayals of whether a legislative
proposal is in fact just another passing of a popularly repealed law or whether a legislative statute
is or is not an amendment to an initiative. See Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112,
1119 (Cal. 1995); Martin v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307, 311 (1959); Bartosh v. Bd. of Osteopathic
Exam’rs, 186 P.2d 984, 988 (1947).
322. Tim Rutten, What’s California’s Problem? Its People, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, http://
articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/14/opinion/oe-rutten14.
323. See infra Part III.B.
324. See supra Part II.
325. Manheim, supra note 11, at 1202–06.
326. Ngo, supra note 16, at 264.
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whether passed by itself or by the people—should fall within its
rights as the legislative branch.327
The obeisance to the initiative at the expense of the legislature
has created a dysfunctional government environment in which
special interest-funded initiative measures have changed much of the
structure of the constitution and the state’s laws, doing away with
legislative fact-finding and deliberation.328 In 2012, eleven
propositions made it to the California ballot.329 Four of them were
largely funded by wealthy individuals, while others were primarily
challenged by wealthy critics with millions of dollars worth of
advertising at their command.330 Although the financial elite have
always had a hand in initiatives, they are now involving themselves
in greater numbers and with a broader resource base than ever
before, building coalitions that increase the chances that their
initiatives will be passed; thus, small groups play an outsized role in
setting government policy.331 Given the marginalizing of the
legislature by the initiative process and the increasing role wealthy
interests play in initiative campaigns, it does not seem unrealistic to
believe a return to the age where special interests controlled
government—the same age that necessitated the initiative itself—is
possible and even likely.332
4. The Initiative Has Deviated from
Its Original Purpose
The court’s haphazard interpretation of various rules has ignored
one of the original purposes of the initiative—to defeat legislative
congestion—and has instead transformed the initiative process into
its own sort of legislative blockage.333 The ballot initiative as
envisioned by the Progressive movement looked to defeat the
hamstringing of legislatures by powerful special interest groups such

327. Id. at 264–65.
328. Steinhauer, supra note 313.
329. Normitsu Onishi, California Ballot Initiatives, Born in Populism, Now Come From
Billionaires, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/us/politics
/california-ballot-initiatives-dominated-by-the-very-rich.html?pagewanted=all.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Rutten, supra note 322.
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as the Southern Pacific Railroad.334 The current, barely regulated
initiative system, however, has created a political environment where
nearly any kind of initiative can be proposed, voted on, and defended
with ease.335
This kind of system has perverted the initiative process from its
original status as a “legislative battering ram”336 and a tool initially
aimed at controlling special interests.337 Now, the initiative process
itself may hinder the legislature from legislating effectively, and the
same kinds of powerful special interests that once dominated
legislative processes are now in charge of the initiative.338 The
sizable influence of special interest groups able to fund and
campaign for initiatives has created a system of dysfunctional
overuse of the initiative system.339 Individual donors have been
contributing for and against various initiative measures with tens of
millions of dollars, amounts usually reserved for companies and
political action committees (“PACs”).340 Consumer Watchdog
president Jamie Court remarked, “Hiram Johnson would probably be
turning over in his grave.”341 At this point, the initiative process in
California is a corruption of what the Progressives intended when
they instituted the initiative system.342
334. See Final Talk Made by the Governor, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 8, 1911, at 57;
see also Manheim, supra note 11, at 1185–88 (describing the political situation and
pseudo-“Banana Republic” atmosphere that existed in California and directly led to the adoption
of the initiative).
335. Lisa Pampuch, Ballot-box Budgeting Just the Beginning of California’s Initiative Woes,
MY POINT EXACTLY (Apr. 24, 2012), http://mypointexactly.wordpress.com/2012/04/24/ballot
-box-budgeting-just-the-beginning-of-californias-initiative-woes/.
336. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281,1289 (Cal. 1978).
337. See supra Part II.B.
338. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1190 (“Southern Pacific Railroad—the target of the
1911 initiative process—has recently sponsored its own ballot measures.”).
339. Aaron Sankin, Prop 39: Bringing Jobs Into California Or More Ballot Box Budgeting?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/prop-39-brining
-jobs-into_n_1990232.html.
340. The 2012 California ballot had more millionaire and billionaire wealth behind it than any
other ballot in history. Onishi, supra note 329. One example is hedge-fund billionaire Tom
Steyer, who contributed $21 million of his own money in support of Proposition 39 in 2012.
Sankin, supra note 339.
341. Onishi, supra note 329.
342. Rutten, supra note 322; see also CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 22, in CALIFORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET, SPECIAL ELECTION (Oct. 11, 1911) (Comments of Lee C. Gates, Senator,
34th District, and William C. Clark, Assemblyman, 59th District) (describing how opponents of
the initiative will likely be “servants of special interests” and those who scoff at the idea of
self-government).
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The ease of placing initiatives on the ballot, plus lax limitations
by the courts, has resulted in an environment where one merely
“needs money, not a good idea”343 Persistently low voter turnouts
usually mean that measures rise or fall based on a relatively small
number of votes, which in turn allows sponsors to fashion shrewdly
targeted advertising campaigns to encourage their measures’
passage.344 This has led to what former Oregon Attorney General
Dave Frohnmayer called “tribal politics,” which are based upon
fundamentally undemocratic, sectarian ideals and rooted “in the
exploitation of divisions of class, cash, gender, region, ethnicity,
morality, and ideology—a give-no-quarter and take-no-prisoners
activism that demands satisfaction and accepts no compromise.”345
It is important to make a distinction between these collective
passions, perhaps rooted in racial or sexual prejudices, and what
eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume called the “passion of
interest,”346 or a universal “love of gain” to further the benefit of all a
government’s citizens.347 A passion of interest had a well-defined
economic meaning in Hume’s time,348 while collective passions built
on ethnic loyalties, or by religious and moral outrage, “divide ‘us’
from ‘them’ without any personal target.”349 Now, those “passions of
interest” can be subverted and used by a majoritarian voting bloc to

343. Jessica Levinson, Ballot Initiatives Have Harmed California, KCET (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.kcet.org/updaily/socal_focus/commentary/would-you-like-to-save-california.html.
Signature-gathering has become a commercial enterprise as well—competition to get a superior
service is high, with signatures sometimes coming in at three dollars each. Nannette Miranda,
Signature Gathering Gets Costly for Tax Initiative, KGO-TV NEWS (Mar. 19, 2012), http://
abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/politics&id=8587347. This has led to citizen initiatives,
once a volunteer event, becoming “hijacked” by groups with $2 or $4 million to spend on their
own concerns. Id. For the average citizen, getting a measure on the ballot is close to impossible.
Id. This has also led signature-gathering companies to forsake potentially less-funded statewide
petitions in favor of more lucrative local ballot petitions that may pay a premium for signatures.
Joe Mathews, Price of Ballot Initiative Signatures Plummets, NBC SAN DIEGO (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.nbcsandiego.com/blogs/prop-zero/Petitions-Circulators-Signatures-Gatherers-Ballot
-Initiatives-Measures-Taxes-Budget-Green-Energy-138810329.html.
344. Id.
345. Dave Frohnmayer, The New Tribalism, OLD OREGON, Autumn 1992, at 16.
346. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not ‘Republican Government’: The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 32 (1993).
347. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1878).
348. See FELIX RAAB, THE ENGLISH FACE OF MACHIAVELLI 237 (1964); see also GARRY
WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 83–86, 190–92 (1981) (explaining the
difference and semantics of economic passions of interest and individual “passions” like pride
and ambition).
349. Linde, supra note 346, at 32.
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deprive others of their fundamental rights based on a certain social
prejudice, allowing various factions to divide “us” from “them” with
relative ease.350 If the initiative system is expected to operate as it
was intended to in our republican government, its validity depends
on its ability to avoid the kind of misuse that deliberative institutions
like the legislature were meant to protect.351
5. The Initiative’s Harmful “Ballot Box Budgeting” Effect
The California Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the
initiative power, and significant deference to its use, has complicated
not only the state’s political process but also its fiscal situation.352
The ease with which an initiative can be drafted, sponsored,
campaigned for, and passed, along with the strong safeguards against
intervention by the executive or legislative branches, have made
“ballot box budgeting” an all-too-easy quick fix to California’s
budget problems—fixes that, more often than not, lead to more
problems.353
A short explanation of ballot box budgeting is in order. Until
very recently,354 California, unlike most states, required a
supermajority before the legislature could pass a budget.355 This
made it exceedingly difficult for a majority party to get the amount
of concessions and agreements necessary to pass a budget plan.356
Predictably, this ponderous process frustrated California voters,
leading many to turn to the initiative power to tackle budget
problems—even after the supermajority requirement was
eliminated.357 Voters are able to pass a budget via an initiative with
350. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 600–01.
351. Linde, supra note 346, at 34.
352. Pampuch, supra note 335.
353. Jessica A. Levinson, Ballot Box Budgeting in California: The Bane of the Golden State
or an Overstated Problem?, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 693 (2010).
354. Voters changed the supermajority requirement in 2010. Anthony York, Voters Pass
Prop. 25, Allowing Legislative Majority Vote to Pass California Budget, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2010/11/voters-pass-prop-25-allowing
-legislative-majority-vote-to-pass-california-budget.html.
355. Supermajority Vote Requirements to Pass the Budget: A Legisbrief, NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/supermajority
-vote-requirements-to-pass-the-budget.aspx. Only Arkansas and Rhode Island have a
supermajority requirement for the passage of a budget. Levinson, supra note 353, at 691. The
population of both states combined is about 3.8 million—California’s equals about 37 million. Id.
356. Id.
357. Of the states that allow some sort of initiative process, less than half permit budgeting by
initiative. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN THE
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only a simple majority, as with any other initiative.358 This process,
called “ballot box budgeting,” has hampered the legislature by
undermining the regular budget process and substituting a process
that aims to do well but instead, often makes things worse.359 What
was once solely “the work of elected officials who have the benefit
of hearings, staff analysis and institutional memory has been given to
voters to make what is tantamount to a snap decision.”360
Proposition 98 is a good example. That successful measure on
the November 1988 ballot required that a certain minimum
percentage of the state budget be spent on public education,
essentially mandating an increase in education spending.361 The
mandatory spending floor placed enormous pressure on all other
facets of the state budget, from the prisons to the courts.362 The
initiative happened to pass at a moment when California was
generating unexpectedly high tax revenues.363 $1 billion of this extra
income, which the legislature might have channeled into the areas
where it was most needed, was instead completely allocated to
education.364 Whether a given allocation of funds makes sense or not
at the time it passes, codifying budgeting decisions in this way
effectively cripples the legislature’s ability to adjust for future
changes—which is exactly what happened when the next recession
hit the state’s underfunded reserves.365 As one would expect,
budgetary issues like these caused by initiatives have put California

21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL I&R TASK FORCE, 17–
20 (July 2002), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR_rep
ort.pdf.
358. Levinson, supra note 353, at 692.
359. Pampuch, supra note 335.
360. Id.
361. California Proposition 98, Mandatory Education Spending (1988), BALLOTPEDIA
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_98,_Mandatory
_Education_Spending_(1988).
362. Kevin O’Leary, How the Initiative Culture Broke California, TIME (Feb. 26, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1968141,00.html.
363. “In a nutshell: Prop 98 ties school funding, in part, to year-to-year changes in state
revenue. But the year-to-year changes projected by this year’s budget deal ended up being wrong,
making it seem as though revenues are growing faster than projected, thus guaranteeing schools
more money.” John Myers, $21 Billion Deficit Now, Worse Later, KQED (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://blogs.kqed.org/capitalnotes/2009/11/18/21-billion-deficit-now-worse-later/.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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in an increasingly “tightening straitjacket” of its people’s own
making.366
The inability of a vast body like the electorate to collectively
implement a rational financial plan has made it difficult for the
legislature to budget properly, either by tying up sizable portions of
the budget or by making it difficult to properly allocate funds in a
shifting economic climate.367 The average voter is likely unaware of
the full consequences of such initiatives, which are often marketed to
voters in ways that emphasize limited tax impacts or their mandates
to spend on worthy subjects like education, and not their overall
fiscal impact.368 This has led to a pervasive attitude of “something
for nothing,”369 where voters feel compelled to vote for measures
they believe will benefit them with no explanation of how the
propositions’ potential costs will be funded.370
An example of this is Proposition 37. This failed 2012 initiative
attempted to mandate certain labeling and advertising procedures for
genetically modified food.371 Its fiscal impact was described in
vague, simplistic terms, with an indeterminate explanation of
costs.372 According to the proposition’s sponsors, annual state costs
for the regulation of labels for genetically engineered foods were
estimated to rise anywhere from a few hundred thousand dollars to
over $1 million.373 The sponsors acknowledged potential costs to
state and local governments for litigation-related expenses arising
from violations of the measure.374 However, the proposition
suggested, also in vague terms, that such violations might pay for
366. O’Leary, supra note 362.
367. See Levinson, supra note 353, at 696–97; see also William M. Lunch, Budgeting by
Initiative: An Oxymoron, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 663, 669 (1998) (describing the difficulty for
legislators in balancing the competing interests of various initiative measures with the need to
create a balanced state budget); Kevin O’Leary, The Citizen Assembly: An Alternative to the
Initiative, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1489, 1491–92 (2007) (“[T]he biggest negative is the cumulative
effect of ballot measures—some of them constitutional amendments nearly cast in stone—that
severely hamstring state legislators and governors from doing their jobs.”).
368. Ring, supra note 309.
369. Interview with Joe Matthews, Writer, L.A. TIMES, in L.A., Cal. (Oct. 17, 2012).
370. A summary of Proposition 37’s estimated fiscal impact on state and local government
indicates “increased annual state costs ranging from a few hundred thousand dollars to over $1
million to regulate the labeling of genetically engineered foods,” plus additional potential costs to
state and local governments due to litigation arising under possible violations of the law. Id.
371. California Proposition 37, Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food (2012).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
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themselves, thanks to court filing fees required of each party filing in
the case.375
This problem highlights a major difference between the
lawmaking power of the legislature and that of the electorate: the
popular vote does not go through the same mechanisms of hearings,
committee studies, amendments, and compromises that constitute the
safeguards of a diverse, deliberative legislature.376 This is
particularly relevant in an area like the budget, where legislators
often must anticipate how one part of a budget may affect another;
voters, in contrast, are more likely to see each measure in a
vacuum.377 This essential difference highlights the fundamental flaw
in ballot-box budgeting and is indicative of the larger problem: using
the unrestricted initiative power in an attempt to fix problems that
would be better served by a more deliberative governing process.
B. The Initiative’s Form of Direct Democracy
Threatens to Subvert Our Republican Government
If both direct democracy and republicanism have a place in
California government, then the distinctions and relationship
between the two should be pronounced and easily discernible. As it
stands now, they are not.378 The electorate’s increasing power thanks
to the court’s loose refereeing of the initiative system essentially
places the people’s initiative power on a higher plane than that of the
other branches of government, beyond the reach of the traditional
system of checks and balances.379
Republicanism’s role as a bulwark for minority rights is one of
its shining characteristics.380 The California Supreme Court’s
decisions, however, most notably Strauss, have eroded that
bulwark.381 Reading the revision-amendment distinction narrowly so
as to “subject[] minority rights to a nondeliberative bare majority
vote” goes against the very principles California was founded on,
subverting republican values with the worst traits of direct
375. Id.
376. Linde, supra note 346, at 34.
377. Levinson, supra note 353, at 699.
378. Hans A. Linde, Practicing Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1735, 1755 (1998).
379. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 606–09.
380. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 123 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin
Books 1987).
381. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 140 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J., dissenting).
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democracy.382 In a representative system of government, the
principles of separation of powers, bicameralism, and veto powers,
among others, prevent majority rule from becoming majority
tyranny.383 Normally, judicial review would serve as an appropriate
check on direct democracy.384 The court’s failure to appropriately
protect minority rights—as in Strauss with a strict judicial review of
Proposition 8’s effects—upsets the careful balance between
republicanism and direct democracy in California, tilting the scale
dangerously in favor of direct majoritarian rule.385
The Progressives who instituted the ballot initiative believed that
the ostensibly conflicting ideals of republicanism and direct
democracy could coexist, seeing direct legislation as “a structural
improvement on representative government . . . [that would] fight
and confound special interest.”386 Those same Progressives would no
doubt be surprised, however, by how that spirit of careful, thoughtful
community action has been corrupted by the modern-day ballot
initiative in California. Voters may have only a few months, at most,
to learn of and educate themselves about an upcoming initiative.387
The most common medium through which a voter can gather
information about an initiative is through the corporate media, which
likely have their own biases and agendas.388 The average voter will
likely not be engaged in exchanges of information with her neighbors
or be required to listen to the arguments of those who hold opposing
views or give reasons for her own position.389 Those who are more
familiar than most with the minute details and pros and cons of an
initiative are likely to have gained that information by themselves or
through informal networks of similarly situated family and friends.390

382. Equal Protection, supra note 222, at 1522.
383. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 604.
384. Id. at 609.
385. See id. at 604.
386. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 599.
387. The Secretary of State must place a qualifying initiative on the ballot as long as there are
at least 131 days before the date of the next general election. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(c).
388. Smith, supra note 23, at 572.
389. Id. Nor will they be required to read the text of the initiative itself, nor its title and
summary, nor the pro and con arguments contained in the voting materials. E-mail from Karl M.
Manheim, Professor of Law, Loyola Law Sch., to author (Jan. 25, 2013, 4:44 PM) (on file with
author). The idea that voters are fully informed on the issues is an outdated and idealized notion
that likely hasn’t existed since the eighteenth-century New England town halls. Id.
390. Id.
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When it comes time to decide on a ballot measure, California
voters can vote “yes,” vote “no,” or stay home and ignore the issue
entirely.391 This is a far cry from the spirit of community action
“resulting in analysis and deduction”392 that the Progressives
imagined, and it stands in stark contrast to the Jeffersonian model of
convention, where speakers may “convey the nuances of their
position, the order of their preferences, and their emerging support
for alternative proposals.”393 In private, individuals’ prejudices are
more easily acted on than in an open, public environment like a
representative congress.394 This creates an environment where it is
easy for initiatives to succeed on the basis of class, money, gender,
locale, morality, and ethnicities—indeed, the majority of initiatives
are used to enact views based on those criteria.395 As initiatives
proliferate and the judiciary’s reluctance to impose meaningful
restrictions on the initiative power grows, the electorate’s power
increases at the expense of the legislature.396
What Strauss has created—and what the court’s broad
interpretation of the initiative power may lead to in the future—is
law that undermines the very first sentence of the California
Constitution: “All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights.”397 This outcome, too, conflicts with the
Jeffersonian ideal of direct democracy, in which the majority would
not have the ability to pass any law that would fundamentally
reshape the social contract and infringe on an individual’s rights.398
By allowing a bare majority of the electorate to circumvent the
normal constraints of republicanism that would have surely defeated
a measure such as the one at issue in Strauss,399 the current initiative
system “invites appeals to private prejudices that are denied and
disclaimed in an open or representative process.”400 While the
Progressives created the initiative to serve an ideal of an interested
citizenry that had the inclination and time to continuously participate
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Id.
Bourne, supra note 78, at 11.
Smith, supra note 23, at 572.
Linde, supra note 378, at 1744.
Id. at 1738–39.
Id. at 1737.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
JEFFERSON, supra note 72, at 189.
In fact, it already did. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 384 (Cal. 2008).
Linde, supra note 378, at 1744.
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in politics and lawmaking, without regard for self-interest,401 most
individual voters who participate in the initiative process are
eminently self-interested.402 Nevertheless, courts continue to
interpret the initiative power as generously as possible, allowing
prejudiced views to dominate without any sort of inhibition at the
ballot box.403 “The self-selected private lawmakers are ‘the least
accountable branch’ . . . free by design to make law in ‘ignorance
and self-deception.’”404 This is just what James Madison and other
Federalists feared most about direct democracy.405
A proper democratic society must be able to strike a careful
balance between a process that permits amendments reasonable in
their scope and effect, without becoming so permissive as to be
susceptible to incessant propositions threatening the social
contract.406 Doing so would help prevent individuals, minority or
otherwise, from being deprived of their rights.407 If a state is going to
allow a form of direct democracy to constitute a major part of the
legislative process, that allowance must limit measures motivated by
reasons abhorred and feared by those who designed a republican
form of government.408 Strauss instead threatens to send California
down a path where direct majoritarian power overwhelms that of the
original republican government.409
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
An examination of the California Supreme Court’s rulings over
the years and the overwhelming power the initiative system has
gained in twenty-first-century California makes it clear that our state
system of direct democracy threatens to overwhelm the ideal of
republican government enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.410 Strauss
demonstrates that California’s lack of procedural or subject-matter
401. Id. at 1739–40.
402. For example, there is a crucial difference between voting to reduce taxes on your
constituent base and voting to reduce taxes on yourself. Id. at 1742.
403. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 138–40 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J., dissenting).
404. Linde, supra note 378, at 1744.
405. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin
Books 1987).
406. Smith, supra note 23, at 576.
407. Id.
408. Linde, supra note 346, at 21.
409. See Ngo, supra note 16, at 245–48.
410. See supra Part III.B.
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limitations may even cause conflicts with the U.S. Constitution’s
basic federal rights and recognized suspect classes.411 Our initiative
system is both extremely powerful and extremely inflexible—
limiting its power while increasing its flexibility is the only way to
return California’s ballot initiative process to a level commensurate
with republican tripartite government and the legislature’s own
power. A stricter pre-election review; a more stringent
revision-amendment distinction; the potential involvement of the
legislature; a deliberative, longer initiative process; and a sharper line
limiting what the electorate can accomplish through the initiative
process can help establish a clearer border between the reach of the
electorate’s power and that of the legislature.412
A. The Court Should Cast Aside Its Preference for Using
Technical, Formalistic Rules in Isolation, as It Did in Strauss
The “qualitative” prong of the revision-amendment distinction
should be more strictly construed; if there is any doubt that an
initiative is a revision, it should be struck down. This will prevent
any questionable amendments that on the surface may present only a
few lines’ worth of change to the California Constitution, but in
effect could abridge a fundamental, protected right or impinge on the
rights of a protected suspect class. The judiciary’s role in protecting
minority rights would be better served with a more expansive reading
of California precedent so as to define fundamental rights like equal
protection and due process as essential components of the structure
or framework of government.413 Indeed, Justice Werdegar’s
revision-amendment standard from her concurrence in Strauss
articulated such an idea.414 The court would be better served by
classifying any measure, however narrow, that discriminates against
a minority group in any way as a revision of the foundational
principle of equal protection.415

411. Ngo, supra note 16, at 269; see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (dealing
with a controversial California initiative—Proposition 14—that permitted racial discrimination in
housing and was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as encouraging discrimination and thus
violating a basic federal right).
412. See infra Part IV.A–B.
413. Equal Protection, supra note 222, at 1516.
414. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 124 (Cal. 2009) (Werdegar, J., concurring).
415. Equal Protection, supra note 222, at 1521.
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Similarly, by applying a new perspective on the single-subject
rule’s “reasonably germane” standard, the number of frivolous,
logrolling initiatives may be reduced while clearing up issues of
voter confusion.416 Specifically, if there is a question as to whether a
measure’s provisions align under the “reasonably germane” standard,
the court should favor a narrow construction rather than a liberal one
that may implicate a whole variety of laws under a general, catchall
term.417 An initiative should not be passed simply because its drafters
were able to come up with a name broad enough to feasibly
encompass all of the initiative’s various sections.418 Although
decades of precedent buttress the current “reasonably germane”
standard, by construing an initiative more narrowly the court will not
be in danger of prohibiting “the sovereign people from either
expressing or implementing their own will on matters of such direct
and immediate importance to them. . . .”419 Instead, the court will be
supporting the expression and implementation of the people’s will by
construing initiatives as closely as possible to how they were
presented to the voters, rather than allowing the people to be fooled
by vague terms like “criminal justice” and “advertising.”420
While it would be inefficient to expect the court to look at each
initiative that comes before it on a case-by-case basis, more
pre-election review would cut down on the number of potentially
unconstitutional initiatives before they are presented to the voters
and discussed by the electorate. There is a potential “ripeness”
problem in such reviews—a valid concern that a claim based on an
anticipated future injury should not be reviewed.421 If an initiative
has not yet been passed by the voters or not even presented to them
(and may eventually be voted down), then courts will likely be wary
of reviewing the issue.422
This argument likely would have arisen if Proposition 8 had
been reviewed before its enactment. If the constitutional amendment
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying had not yet passed, then

416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

Minger, supra note 164, at 928–30.
Id. at 928.
Id. at 929.
Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 281 (Cal. 1982).
Minger, supra note 164, at 929.
Ngo, supra note 16, at 267.
Id.
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how could they have suffered an injury from it?423 However, as the
initiative process stood in 2008, a bare majority was permitted to
strip away a fundamental right via a constitutional amendment.424
Thus, the process of amending the California Constitution to permit
something like that creates “a proximate, real-world link between
California’s constitutional amendment process and the resulting
harm on gay men and lesbians.”425 Looking at the initiative process
itself as a potential source of harm, rather than merely at the
amendment language, can help solve any ripeness issues for those
looking for more pre-election review of initiative statutes that may
toe the line of certain initiative restrictions like the
revision-amendment distinction.426
B. The Initiative Power Should Be Modified
to Clearly Delineate the Lines Between
Republicanism and Direct Democracy
The structure of the initiative should be modified to further the
overriding purpose of dividing constitutional power between the
people and the legislature, making sure to delineate clear and sharp
lines between the conflicting ideas of republicanism and direct
democracy. One way to make this happen is to change the format of
an initiative to require the input of the legislature before initiatives
go to a popular vote.427 The state of Massachusetts uses an indirect
initiative process for its constitutional amendments.428 In order to
amend the state constitution, an amendment must be supported by a
quarter of the legislature at two constitutional conventions, which are
simply joint meetings of the state’s House of Representatives and
Senate.429 The first convention may modify the amendment via a
three-fourths vote, while the second convention cannot modify the
amendment at all.430
An example of this process in action occurred in 2004, when a
Massachusetts group attempted to amend the state constitution to ban
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

Id.
Id. at 268–69.
Id. at 269.
Id.
See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 615–16.
Id. at 613.
Id.
MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, § 4.
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same-sex marriage.431 Although the amendment passed the first
convention, it failed 157 votes to 39 in the second.432 This is a fine
example of the citizens of a state attempting to amend its constitution
but failing after sufficient time had passed.433 This additional time
between meetings allowed for a proper amount of deliberation and
discussion regarding the amendment and led to involved legislators
finding it antithetical to the rights of a minority group.434 Involving
the state legislature in an amendment ensures that any change to the
state’s constitution is carefully reviewed and openly debated.435 This
is preferable to voters having to deal with a firestorm of conflicting
media campaigns preceding an instantaneous decision on election
day, made in the secrecy of a voting booth.436 This “sober second
thought”437 is just the kind of meticulous, reasoned approach that
Jefferson advocated in his vision of direct democracy and the
opposite of what often occurs in California’s hyperactive initiative
process.438
Alternatively, California could require a longer delay between
the time a proposal is first proposed and the time it finally comes to a
vote.439 In this system, the electorate could debate the issue, much as
the legislature debates the issue under the Massachusetts system.440
In June 2011, Oregon became the first state to pass an innovative
process called “Citizens’ Initiative Review,” in which a citizen panel
of eighteen to twenty-four people meets for a week, hears testimony
on all sides of a measure, summarizes it, and then writes both a pro
argument and a con argument.441 This allows more time for debate
and discussion between an initiative’s becoming eligible and the
election, as opposed to the rapid, 131-day minimum turnaround in

431. Raphael Lewis, After Vote, Both Sides in Debate Energized, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 15,
2005, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/09/15/after_vote_both
_sides_in_debate_energized.
432. Id.
433. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 615
434. Id.
435. Ngo, supra note 16, at 271.
436. Id.
437. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 611, 615.
438. See Smith, supra note 23, at 572.
439. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 615.
440. Id. at 613–14.
441. See Ore. House Bill 2643, available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/11reg/measpdf/hb2600
.dir/hb2634.en.pdf.
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California.442 While this is a good move to a more involved, open,
direct democracy, it should be only the first step in a movement
designed to build a more deliberate infrastructure for the initiative
process.
While the Oregon system simply allows citizens’ voices to be
heard, allowing those same citizens to propose alternatives to the
initiative would present more options and greater opportunities for
debate.443 The initiative scheme in place in Switzerland, widely
regarded as the birthplace of the initiative, uses such a process to
give voters choices beyond a simple “yes” or “no” at the polls.444
Like the Massachusetts system, the Swiss initiative structure is
indirect, requiring an initiative to be presented to the Federal
Assembly (the Swiss version of Congress), which then determines
whether the measure is valid and whether the assembly supports it.445
If the assembly supports the initiative, the initiative is presented to
the electorate for a vote; if the assembly does not, however, both the
initiative and a counter-draft designed by the Federal Assembly are
placed on the ballot and the electorate may vote on which one they
prefer.446
These institutional safeguards do allow the Swiss legislature to
impede the initiative process, oftentimes slowing an initiative’s
passage by several years.447 Only about 10 percent of initiatives that
make it to the ballot are accepted by both the people and the
legislature.448 However, using this same counter-draft proposal—not
with the California legislature but with a panel of California citizens,
along the lines of Oregon’s system—would permit differing
viewpoints to be heard without the potential prohibitive influence of
the legislature.449 This would increase the opportunity for
deliberation as well as the time between the creation of an initiative
442. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 615.
443. See Ore. House Bill 2643, available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/11reg/measpdf/hb2600
.dir/hb2634.en.pdf.
444. JOHN M. ALLSWANG, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 3 (Stanford
Univ. Press 2000).
445. See MICHAEL GALLAGHER & PIER VINCENZO ULERI, THE REFERENDUM EXPERIENCE
IN EUROPE 188 (MacMillan Press Ltd. 1996).
446. Id. A similar system is in place in Washington State. See Direct Democracy: The
Initiative and Referendum Process in Washington, THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
WASHINGTON ED. FUND, (Oct. 2002), http://www.lwvwa.org/pdfs/studies/init-ref-study.pdf.
447. See GALLAGHER & ULERI, supra note 445, at 188.
448. Chrysler, supra note 17, at 611.
449. Id.
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and the election.450 The debate between opponents and proponents of
a measure would create mediating stages that might prevent extreme
proposals from winning a majority vote.451 The Swiss initiative
system imposes another burden by requiring a double-majority vote
for an initiative to pass into law.452
Other states have instituted subject-matter restrictions that limit
what an initiative can propose.453 As the Strauss court pointed out,
there are currently no such limitations on the type of constitutional
amendments that can be proposed or what sections of the state
constitution are off-limits to amendment.454 The initiative power
should be amended to add subject-matter restrictions, thus forbidding
any constitutional amendment that could conceivably affect a basic
federal right or impinge on a federally protected suspect class such as
homosexuals.455 California could also maintain the current
subject-matter standard and add a heightened voting requirement for
initiatives that amend the actual constitution, much as the Swiss
system requires.456 By leaving a bare majority vote in place for
initiative legislation, and imposing a greater majority approval for
initiatives proposing constitutional amendments, the initiative will
still be a powerful tool of legislation for the electorate, but California
Constitution—the foundation of the state’s government—will
become more stable and harder to change.457
C. The Proposed Changes Will Not
Subvert the People’s Initiative Power
When California first drafted its constitution in 1849, it required
a majority of each house of the legislature to concur on a proposed
amendment in two separate legislative sessions before the
amendment could be submitted to the voters.458 The changes
450. See id. at 611–12.
451. Id. at 611.
452. A double-majority vote requires a majority of the population and a majority of the
cantons (the Swiss counterpart to a state). GALLAGHER & ULERI, supra note 445, at 188.
453. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 108–09 (Cal. 2009) (using the constitutions of
Massachusetts and Mississippi as examples of voter initiatives that prohibit constitutional
amendments that affect rights contained in the state’s bill of rights).
454. Id. at 109–10.
455. Ngo, supra note 16, at 270.
456. See GALLAGHER & ULERI, supra note 445, at 188.
457. Ngo, supra note 16, at 270–71.
458. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 80–81 (2009).
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proposed above will not return California to its roots, where passing
a constitutional amendment was a rigorous and slow process that
barely involved the people.459 None of these proposals will take
away the precious initiative power that, despite its many problems,
has afforded so much positive growth and change in California’s
society and government.460 What these changes will do is engender a
spirit of reflection, accountability, and sober, reasoned discussion
when it comes to changing the California Constitution.461 These
changes will also return the initiative to a level where the electorate’s
legislative power is commensurate with that of the legislature, and
the lines between direct democracy and republicanism are clearly set
and defined.462
V. CONCLUSION
As it stands now, California’s ballot initiative process faces very
little effective regulation from the courts, despite the enumerated
restrictions ostensibly designed to limit the people’s power.463 The
California Supreme Court’s distinction between what constitutes a
revision and what constitutes an amendment is needlessly narrow,
endangering fundamental principles of our government, such as
equal protection, and opening up the door for future restriction of
essential rights by a majoritarian group.464 The court’s interpretation
of the single-subject rule’s “reasonably germane” standard has
reduced the rule to something initiative drafters pay lip service to,
increasing voter confusion and increasing the number of bloated,
convoluted initiatives.465 The court’s heightened standard of review
of legislative amendments modifying initiative statutes has firmly
established the electorate on a level above that of the legislature and
hampered the legislature’s ability to edit bills for efficiency,
budgetary considerations, or other important governmental
459. See Manheim, supra note 11, at 1184–85.
460. The initiative process in California has shepherded numerous progressive reforms as
well as social and cultural ones over the years, particularly in the field of labor—eight-hour work
days for women, restrictions on child labor, and the establishment of an Industrial Accident Board
have all come about from the initiative process. RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS:
THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 187 (Univ. Press of Kan. 2002).
461. See Chrysler, supra note 17, at 616.
462. See Linde, supra note 378, at 1760.
463. See supra Part II.C.1–3.
464. See supra Part III.A.1.
465. See supra Part III.A.2.
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concerns.466 Furthermore, issues arising from the proliferation of
initiatives, such as ballot box budgeting, have only continued to
hamstring the effective functioning of government.467 Finally, the
original aims of the initiative have been corrupted by the court’s
passive enforcement of its own various rules, creating a system of
majoritarian direct democracy that threatens to subvert our
constitutionally mandated republican government.468
A stricter consideration of the revision-amendment distinction, a
more lenient standard of pre-election review, greater involvement
and collaboration with the legislature, allowing proposal alternatives,
and potentially instituting a double-majority voting system or
subject-matter restrictions, would all contribute to the goal of
returning the initiative to the role that its originators intended.469
Until Californians provide for an initiative process that enhances
rather than subverts rational, deliberative thought and discussion,
there will be no way to rein in California’s initiative process and
maintain the necessary balance between direct democracy and
republicanism.

466.
467.
468.
469.

See supra Part III.A.3.
See supra Part III.A.5.
See supra Part III.A.4, Part III.B.
See supra Part IV.

